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Abstract 
A central feature of electricity market reforms involved restructuring monopoly 
utilities.  In the Generation segment, policies promoting restructuring and 
competition could not be faulted on the grounds of scale economies.  But the 
partitioning of Generation from Retail received little focus.  When proposals 
for industry restructuring emerged, multi-stage scope economies should have 
been of unquestionable interest but surprisingly little empirical evidence 
existed.  Governments proceeded in the 1990s with an industrial organisation 
blueprint which separated Generation from Networks, and combined Retail 
with Distribution Networks.  A second wave of industrial organisation was 
orchestrated by capital markets in the 2000s, splitting Retail from Distribution, 
and merging Retail with Generation.  Many policymakers and regulators view 
the practice of vertical integration in a neoclassical sense; presenting risks of 
withholding capacity, increasing prices, raising barriers to entry, non-
integrated rival foreclosure and damaging consumer welfare.  But the weight 
of theoretical and empirical evidence points to the contrary, with transaction 
costs featuring prominently.  In this article, a Generator and Retailer are 
simulated over 15 years of trade in Australia’s National Electricity Market as 
stand-alone businesses, and then as a merged entity.  A comparison of the 
Sum-Of-The-Parts with the Vertical Firm reveals non-trivial transaction costs 
and multi-stage economies of integration – the Vertical Firm reduces costs by 
17% and volatility of earnings by 83%, which produces a 26% improvement in 
credit quality and lifts statutory profits by 34% holding prices and volumes 
constant.  
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1. Introduction 
For most of the 20th Century the vertically integrated power industry was one of the 
leading sectors of the economy vis-à-vis productivity, scale economies and 
technology development (Joskow, 1987).  By the 1980s sector performance 
deteriorated across countries such as the US, Great Britain and Australia (Joskow, 
1987; Kellow, 1996; Newbery and Pollitt, 1997).  Along with material capital 
misallocation, overcapacity and rising prices (Pierce, 1984; Hoecker, 1987) utility 
service boundaries were frequently economically meaningless (Fairman and 
Scott,1977).   
 
Disaggregating vertical monopoly utilities1 and creating competition within Generation 
and Retail segments can be traced as far back as Weiss (1973).  As Landon (1983) 
explained, the basis of restructuring was i). economic regulation had failed (Stigler 
and Friedland, 1962; Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Moore, 1975; Peltzman, 1976), ii). 
in Generation, scale economies were increasingly extracted at the plant level 
(Christensen and Greene, 1976; Huettner and Landon, 1978), iii). system 
coordination could be managed through contracts, iv). networks could be regulated 
 
 Professor of Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University.  
 Research Associate, Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge. 
11 For an excellent discussion of the diversity of industrial organisation within the electricity industry prior to the 
reforms, see Schmalensee (2019). 
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as common carriers (Smith, 1996), and, v). a presumption that economies of scope 
and integration were most likely minimal.  It was therefore thought electricity would 
be most efficiently supplied via specialised firms competing in their respective stages 
of production. 
 
Limits to scale economies in power generation had been empirically documented as 
early as Christensen & Green (1976) and Huettner & Landon (1978) – key insights 
being the average total cost curve for power generation was very flat for a broad 
range of output.  Moreover, technology changes (i.e. Combined Cycle Gas Turbine) 
meant scale-efficient entry was contracting after more than 60 years of unit size 
expansion (Joskow, 1987; Hunt and Shuttleworth, 1996; Meyer, 2012a).  
Consequently, policies promoting restructuring and competition could not be faulted 
on the grounds of scale economies.  But presumptions that economies of integration 
‘were most likely minimal’ are surprising in hindsight.  The presence of multi-stage 
economies of integration is an empirical question and remarkably little (if any) 
evidence existed prior to Kaserman and Mayo’s (1991) pioneering work in the field. 
 
Nonetheless, restructuring plans proceeded. Efficiency gains from competition 
focused on the Generation segment (Weiss, 1973; Fairman and Scott, 1977; Landon, 
1983).  This was justified given overcapacity and deteriorating economic 
performance (Pierce, 1984; Hoecker, 1987; Joskow, 1987; Newbery and Pollitt, 
1997; Booth, 2000; Simshauser, 2005).  The first practical electricity market 
experiment based on Weiss’s (1973) constructs commenced in Chile from 1978 
(Pollitt, 2004)2.  Ground breaking work by Schweppe et al. (1988) on organised spot 
markets for electricity would lead to widespread adoption of industry restructuring 
and competitive markets.  A wave of microeconomic reform swept through western 
economies during the 1990s, the centrepiece being vertical and horizontal 
disaggregation and creation of competitive wholesale and contestable retail markets, 
based on the landmark England & Wales pool (Newbery, 2005, 2006).   Any notion 
that the industry was a natural vertical monopoly was dispelled. 
 
In markets characterised by generation overcapacity, initial gains from competition 
were predictable, and non-trivial.  By almost any measure Australia’s National 
Electricity Market (NEM) could only be described as a miracle of microeconomic 
reform (Simshauser, 2014).  The Australian policy program was typical, commencing 
with extensive vertical industrial re-organisation of state-owned vertical monopoly 
utilities by four State Governments, viz. Queensland (QLD), New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia.3  Horizontal restructuring followed to create competition 
amongst Generation and Retail Supply.  When the industrial organisation dust settled 
and System Operations and market mechanisms synchronised across the 4 regions, 
15 rival portfolio Generators4, four regional Transmission Networks and 14 
Distribution/Retail Supply5 entities emerged.6  The industrial organisation blueprint 
segregated competitive segments from natural monopoly segments (Transmission, 
Distribution) and crucially, Generation was partitioned from Retail Supply. 
 
In the NEM blueprint, the first wave of industrial organisation was driven by 
government and competition policy across vertical and horizontal dimensions.  A 
second wave would be driven by capital markets across three dimensions (vertical, 
horizontal, geographic) in pursuit of optimal asset allocation, efficiency gains and 
profit maximisation. 
 
2 As Pollitt (2004) notes, vertical and horizontal restructuring was completed by 1981 and enabling legislation enacted 
in 1982.   
3 Throughout the 1990s, the four governments agreed to a common set of market rules and proceeded to vertically 
restructure their state-own vertical monopoly utilities into separate generation, transmission, and distribution/retail 
entities.   
4 This included 4 portfolio generators in QLD, 4 in NSW (including Snowy Hydro), 5 in VIC, 3 in SA. 
5 This included 2 in QLD, 6 in NSW, 1 in the ACT, 5 in VIC and 1 in SA. 
6 The NEM’s 5th Region, Tasmania is somewhat complicated by the fact that it only joined the NEM in 2006, and for a 
range of reasons including politics and scale, remained a largely monopoly/monopsony regional market. 
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The first step involved vertical divestment of Retail from Distribution.  Retail Supply 
(‘Retailers’) were initially stapled to a Distribution Network monopoly, a model 
common to Great Britain and Australia being ‘the best that could be done at the time’ 
given complex business interfaces (Helm, 2014).7  While customer interface costs 
(billing, call centres) are sub-additive, merchant Retailers are fundamentally different 
to regulated Distribution Networks and consequently, every Distribution Network in 
the NEM (and Great Britain) divested their Retail business.  These vertical structural 
separations were ‘value-driven’ investor events – capital markets consistently 
undervalued Distributor-Retailer businesses.8  Sum-Of-The-Parts valuations revealed 
divestment would yield higher total returns.  
 
The corollary to this reorganisation was Retailers losing the ‘credit-wrap’ provided by 
their capital-intensive (investment-grade) Distribution Network parent company, and 
as Nillesen and Pollitt (2011, 2019) explain, the start of the loss of competitive 
intensity.  The second step of industrial reorganisation that followed involved 
horizontal consolidation across geographies.  The NEM’s 14 incumbent Retailers 
lacked scale and progressively consolidated to remain competitive. Mergers & 
Acquisitions (M&As) occurred amongst privatised and government-owned Retailers.9  
Curiously, State and Commonwealth Governments and competition regulators 
waived all horizontal M&A events through – evidently prioritising proceeds and 
privatisation over concentration and competition. 
 
The third step of industrial reorganisation was vertical integration by Retailers.10  
Looking back, an ‘electricity market arms race’ played-out over 1995-2015.  The 
NEM’s ‘Big 3’ Retailers or Gentailers11 emerged as winners from a string of 
horizontal, vertical and geographic privatisation and M&A events over a 20-year 
period. 
   
Vertical re-integration has been deeply unpopular amongst some regulators and 
policymakers in Australia and Great Britain12.  It has been a continual regulatory 
target and more recently in Australia, the subject of policy intrusion13.  Opposition to 
firm boundary changes relates to concerns of vertical market power, withholding 
capacity, adverse impacts on forward market liquidity and foreclosure of rival (non-
integrated) Retailers.  By this logic, vertical integration is presumed to be highly anti-
competitive.  Yet the weight of theoretical and empirical evidence on vertical 
integration overwhelmingly concludes the opposite as Lafontaine & Slade (2007) and 
others14 note.  To the extent that market power events have occurred in the NEM, 
their source was horizontal power, not vertical power – something which seems to 
 
7 It also ensured Retailers had substantial asset backing. 
8 Networks have stable regulated returns, whereas Retailers exhibited increasingly volatile results - a natural 
outworking of retail contestability and the extreme volatility of wholesale prices in an energy-only market setting.  
Although in New Zealand, forced divestiture seemed to produce very little benefit and a loss on competition (Nillesen 
and Pollitt, 2011, 2019). 
9 Indeed, the States of QLD and NSW consolidated their own Retail Supply businesses from nine down to just four 
prior to, or during, privatisation processes in 2007 and 2011 respectively.  There were originally three franchise 
retailers in Queensland and six in New South Wales.  In Queensland, Origin Energy and AGL Energy purchased the 
retail businesses.  In New South Wales, Origin Energy and Energy Australia purchased the retail businesses. 
10 Forward integration also became the dominant strategy amongst incumbent generators – many of which have 
formed large vertical businesses. 
11Australia’s ‘Big 3’ are AGL Energy, Origin Energy, EnergyAustralia.  Two other large integrated rivals are Alinta 
Energy and Snowy Hydro (and retail business Red Energy).  (Godofredo, de Bragança and Daglish, 2017) note the 
term Gentailer was commonly used in Great Britain, Australia & New Zealand, and first appears in the literature in 
(Meade, 2005). 
12 See for example ACCC’s 2018 Restoring electricity affordability and Australia’s competitive advantage Report, 
AER’s 2011 State of the Energy Market Report, and in the case of Great Britain, see Ofgem’s 2014 State of the 
Market Assessment Report. 
13 See the Treasury Laws Amendment (Prohibiting Energy Market Misconduct) Bill 2019), known as the ‘Big Stick 
Bill’. 
14 See for example (Cooper et al., 2005; Mansur, 2007; Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008; Joskow, 2010; 
Simshauser, Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015; Guo et al., 2020).  
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have bedevilled Australia’s competition regulators and policymakers (Simshauser, 
2019a).   
 
Vertical firms have been the NEM’s historically dominant providers of new 
dispatchable plant capacity (i.e. >75% of gas-fired generation plant).  Yet from 2016-
2019 vertical utilities appeared to have stalled new capacity investments despite 
tightening reserve plant margins.  The NEM experienced an acute  business cycle 
from 2012-2019 and new patterns of relative pricing emerged reflecting rising 
Variable Renewable Energy.  Is it possible that market conditions have muted multi-
stage economies that previously existed? 
 
The purpose of this article is to analyse vertical integration amongst merchant utilities 
in the NEM – why it occurs, why it matters to the flow of investment and how material 
multi-stage economies of integration are in Australia’s energy-only market setting.  In 
doing so, this research simulates two businesses from 2004/05-2018/19; viz. i). a 
pure-play Retailer and ii). a merchant Generator of unequal size.  The two firms are 
then merged and compared to the Sum-Of-The-Parts.  Use of half-hourly spot prices, 
forward contract prices, and yearly retail tariffs over a 15-year window produces rich 
insights into industrial organisation in energy-only markets. 
 
Results confirm material transaction costs exist when Generation and Retail are 
partitioned – cumulative costs rise by ~17%, reported earnings fall by ~35% and 
credit quality deteriorates by 26% (holding consumer prices and volumes constant).  
The credit quality of stand-alone businesses are ‘junk’ whereas the vertical firm 
exhibits investment-grade metrics.  Market frictions including bounded rationality, 
instability of wholesale prices, incompleteness of forward markets, asymmetric 
information, regulatory discontinuities and investment under uncertainty are the 
sources of multi-stage economies of integration.  Stalling of new investment in 
peaking capacity must therefore be explained by other reasons, the most prominent 
candidate being random and capricious political interventions aimed at large vertical 
firms. 
    
This article is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides an expansive literature 
review on vertical arrangements. Section 3 introduces data and models. Section 4 
presents results. Conclusions follow.  
 
2. Review of Literature 
There is no unifying theory of vertical integration.  The complexity of forces favouring 
or opposing various forms of industrial organisation make a general theory intractable 
(Green, 1986; Joskow, 2010).  Two broad schools of thought exist15 on the motives 
for vertical integration, i). neoclassical theories which emerged in the 1950s (see 
Bain, 1956) and ii). transaction cost theories, sparked by Williamson (1971). 
 
 Neoclassical theories of vertical integration 
The neoclassical view considers vertical integration as a means by which firms 
acquire market power, withhold intermediate supplies, raise barriers to entry and 
foreclose non-integrated rivals (Bain, 1956). The neoclassical view is underpinned by 
assumptions of perfectly competitive markets, costless spot market transactions and 
plant-level scale economies.  Transaction costs are ignored, and multi-plant scale 
and multi-stage scope economies are assumed away (Williamson, 1971). 
Consequently, vertical arrangements are considered an anomaly. This view was 
translated into policy; the first US Department of Justice ‘merger guidelines’ (1968) 
were relatively hostile towards vertical activity due to perceived risks of vertical 
 
15 While Transaction Cost Economics dominates the literature, two variations are worth noting i). property rights-
based theories vis-à-vis asset specificity, contractual incompleteness and opportunistic behaviour as key motivations 
to maximise the value of ex-post vertical investment decisions (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), 
and ii). principal-agent based theories of vertical integration, which can be classed as theories of moral hazard 
(Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). 
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foreclosure of un-integrated rivals (Reiffen and Vita, 1995; Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007; Michaels, 2007). 
 
Neoclassical theory dissipated during the 1970s following Peltzman (1969) and 
others who highlighted that if a post-integrated firm has market power in one 
segment, that same level of market power existed prior to vertical integration.  
However, theories of economic harm re-emerged within a game-theoretic framework 
from the 1980s.  In Salinger (1988), vertical practices were considered in a 
generalised Cournot oligopoly environment in both the primary and downstream 
market.  Vertical integration was shown to increase input costs of unintegrated rivals, 
thereby reducing their output and adversely affecting welfare.  However, amongst 
vertical firms double mark-ups16 were eliminated (an efficiency benefit of integration) 
and output expanded – the net effect on welfare therefore being ambiguous. 
 
Game-theoretic models typically showed vertical firms withholding capacity, raising 
input costs of non-integrated rivals, with model outcomes being foreclosure (see for 
example Salop and Scheffman 1983, 1987; Salinger, 1988; Ordover, Saoloner and 
Salop, 1990; Martin, Normann and Snyder, 2001). But models underpinning 
neoclassical theories of harm are fragile as Reiffen and Vita (1995) and Cooper et al. 
(2005, p641) explain:   
 
…anticompetitive equilibria emerge only under specific – and difficult to verify 
– assumptions about (among other things) costs, demand, the nature of input 
contracts, conditions of entry, the slope of reaction functions and the 
information available to firms. Seemingly minor perturbations to these 
assumptions can reverse the predicted welfare effects of the practice in 
question… 
 
A vast literature on vertical integration spanning well over 500 articles exists, with 
surprisingly little empirical evidence supporting the neoclassical view (Lafontaine and 
Slade, 2007; Joskow, 2010). 
 
 Transaction cost theories of vertical integration 
Economic theory and empirical evidence on vertical integration is dominated by 
transaction cost motives (Joskow, 2010).  The existence and importance of 
transaction costs is generally attributed to Coase (1937) who examined why firms 
exist at all in an exchange economy.  But it was Williamson (1971, 1973, 1975) who 
predicted changes to firm boundaries when confronted with transaction costs, market 
fictions and hazards associated with i). asset specificity and technical dependencies, 
ii). bounded rationality, iii). contractual incompleteness, iv). security of supply, v). 
regulatory risk and vi). asymmetric information and uncertainty.   
 
Transaction cost theories explain that these variables create hazards for ex-ante 
investment commitment, and ex-post performance.  Faced with any or all of these 
conditions, vertical mergers achieve more adaptive, sequential decision-making 
procedures as market conditions change cf. anonymous spot and forward market 
transactions (Williamson, 1973).  Put simply, the internal laws of the firm are more 
pliable than contract law.  Vertical arrangements better harmonise conflicting 
interests and result in less costly ‘sequential adaptation’ to uncertain business 
conditions over time (Williamson, 1971). 
 
An expansive economics literature explores operating efficiencies as a crucial driver 
of vertical M&A events (Simon, 1955; Williamson, 1979; Landon, 1983; Grossman 
 
16 The issue of eliminating double mark-ups is best explained by reference to a two-stage monopoly industry where 
both upstream and downstream monopolists independently add profit margins (i.e. double marginalisation).  Because 
neither firm knows the true marginal cost of supply, prices are set above the profit maximising level.  Integration 
removes imperfect information and results in the integrated firm setting a lower price, expanding output, and 
increasing firm profits and consumer welfare.   
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and Hart, 1986; Stuckey and White, 1993; Holmström and Roberts, 1998).  Literature 
from financial economics concludes decisions to vary firm scope are optimised when 
targets have similar earnings volatility, asset complementarity, and low earnings 
correlation coefficients (Flannery, Houston and Venkataraman, 1993; Chemmanur 
and John, 1996; Homberg, Rost and Osterloh, 2009; Simshauser, Tian and Whish-
Wilson, 2015; Teti and Tului, 2020).17 
 
 Electricity markets and transaction costs 
Economic theory and power system modelling has long demonstrated organised spot 
markets clear demand reliably and provide investment signals for new plant 
(Schweppe et al. 1988), and, that scale economies in power generation do not 
require large regional monopoly portfolios (Christensen and Greene, 1976).18  This 
suggests electricity markets are best served by specialised firms with gains from 
competition counterbalancing losses of multi-stage economies of integration.  
 
Electricity market theory and modelling is based on equilibrium analysis and 
underpinned by an extensive list of explicit and implicit assumptions including 
unlimited market price caps, perfect capital markets, complete forward markets, 
limited political/regulatory interference and capital structures able to withstand 
elongated energy market business cycles (Simshauser, 2010; Arango and Larsen, 
2011; Cepeda and Finon, 2011; Bublitz et al., 2019).  But as Malmgren (1961) noted, 
deviations from idealised models of perfect competition are the usual state of affairs. 
Central to those deviations are the capital-intensive nature of generating equipment 
and the central role that debt capital plays vis-à-vis investment commitment.  Multi-
stage economies of integration had historically provided a source of coordination 
benefit, including access to low cost finance (Newbery, 2005).  
 
In the electricity market blueprint, stand-alone merchant generators selling output into 
organised spot and forward markets would be underpinned by long-dated non-
recourse project finance – a form of finance first originated in 1981 and well-suited to 
capital-intensive investments (Simshauser and Nelson, 2012). However, electricity 
markets turned out to be much tougher operating environments than originally 
thought.  Persistent generator pricing at marginal cost produced inadequate 
revenues given substantial sunk costs – a problem understood as far back as 
Hotelling (1938), Boiteux (1949) and Turvey (1964).  In restructured energy markets, 
Cramton and Stoft (2005, 2006) labelled this ‘the missing money’ (Peluchon, 2003; 
Simshauser, 2008; Bajo-Buenestado, 2017; Keppler, 2017; Milstein and Tishler, 
2019).  
 
While the theory is based on equilibrium, electricity markets are typically off 
equilibrium for extended periods (de Vries and Heijnen, 2008; Hirth, Ueckerdt and 
Edenhofer, 2016).  Because merchant generators face rigid debt repayment 
schedules, theories of organised spot markets suffer from an inadequate treatment of 
how non-trivial sunk capital costs are financed (Joskow, 2006; Finon, 2008; 
Simshauser, 2010; Caplan, 2012).   
 
Von der Fehr and Harbord (1995) first observed that indivisibility of capacity, 
construction lead-times, lumpy entry, investment tenor and policy uncertainty make 
merchant generation investments unusually risky.  Early contributions on market 
frictions which focused on the special complexity of peaking plant investments 
include Doorman (2000), Besser et al. (2002), Stoft (2002), de Vries (2003), Oren 
 
17 In Modigliani and Miller (1958) and their classic framework without taxes, bankruptcy costs, information 
asymmetries and agency costs, a formal mathematic proof demonstrated that capital structure was irrelevant and that 
no such synergies could exist. However, when the simplifying assumptions were relaxed, capital structure was found 
to be important, and this implies changes in firm scope can create financing efficiencies as well as operating 
efficiencies (Leland, 2007; Simshauser, Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015). 
18 See also Huettner and Landon (1978), Joskow (1987), Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996) and Meyer (2012a). 
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(2003) and Peluchon (2003).19  Entire editions of academic journals have been 
dedicated to the topic.20  Indeed, once the implicit and explicit assumptions 
underpinning electricity market theory are relaxed and transaction costs introduced, it 
can be shown that energy-only markets with an administratively determined Value of 
Lost Load (VoLL) can only reach a stable equilibrium when the power system is 
operating near the edge of collapse (Bidwell & Henney, 2004).   
 
In theory, a high VoLL provides the means by which to bridge equilibrium conditions 
but rival electricity market participants are unable to optimise the number of VoLL 
events (Cramton et al. 2013).  Further, actions by regulators and System Operators 
frequently suppress legitimate price signals (Joskow, 2008; Hogan, 2013; Spees, 
Newell and Pfeifenberger, 2013; Leautier, 2016)21.  Australia’s NEM is also suffering 
from various forms of random political interventions (Simshauser, 2019b; Wood, 
Dundas and Percival, 2019).  Consequently, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest timely entry on a merchant basis is no longer possible (Finon 2008 and 
others22). To be clear, merchant plant will eventually enter if prices are high enough.  
But the political economy of such prices, and the market conditions which generate 
them, makes this highly problematic. 
 
This is more than a theoretical discussion. In the early phases of the global 
restructuring experiment, a vast fleet of merchant plant was project financed on the 
basis of spot prices and short-term forward contracts.  But recurring damage to 
merchant generator profit & loss statements arising from structural oversupply and 
episodes of missing money led project banks to tighten credit parameters 
(Simshauser, 2010). By 2004 a surprisingly large proportion of merchant plants in the 
US, Great Britain and Australia experienced financial distress, capital restructuring or 
outright bankruptcy (Joskow, 2006; Michaels, 2007; Finon, 2008; Simshauser, 
2010).23  This re-set preconditions for project finance – the main implication being 
new entrant merchant plant could no longer obtain project finance (as Section 4.1 
later demonstrates).     
 
Central to this is incomplete markets – the inability of electricity markets to deliver the 
optimal mix of derivative instruments required to facilitate efficient plant entry, 
specifically, long-dated contracts sought by risk averse project banks as Newbery 
(2016) and others24 note.  Australia’s NEM is noted for favourable forward market 
liquidity25 (Fig.1). But activity spans 3 years, well short of optimal financing structures.  
Forward markets have failed to calibrate beyond this because competitive Retailers 
cannot afford to hold hedge portfolios dominated by inflexible long-dated contracts 
when large components of their customer book switch supplier every 2-3 years 
(Newbery 2006, Anderson et al. 2007 amongst others26).  
 
Concerns over timely plant investment are compounded by the fact that large 
segments of real-time aggregate demand are price-inelastic and unable to react to 
 
19 See also Bushnell, 2004; Wen, Wu and Ni, 2004; Neuhoff and De Vries, 2004; Hogan, 2005, 2013; Roques, 
Newbery and Nuttall, 2005; Cramton and Stoft, 2006; Simshauser, 2008; Finon, 2008; Finon and Pignon, 2008; 
Joskow, 2008; Spees, Newell and Pfeifenberger, 2013; Cramton, Ockenfels and Stoft, 2013.   
20 See Utilities Policy Volume 16 (2008) and Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy Volume 2 (2013). 
21 See also Besser, Farr and Tierney, 2002; de Vries, 2003; Oren, 2003; Wen, Wu and Ni, 2004; Batlle and Pérez-
Arriaga, 2008; Finon and Pignon, 2008. 
22 See also Bidwell and Henney, 2004; Cramton and Stoft, 2006; de Vries and Heijnen, 2008; Roques, 2008; Howell, 
Meade and O’Connor, 2010; Simshauser, 2010; Caplan, 2012; Nelson and Simshauser, 2013; Simshauser, Tian and 
Whish-Wilson, 2015; Hirth, Ueckerdt and Edenhofer, 2016. 
23 By 2005, more than 110,000 MW of merchant plant in the US, much of the Australian merchant fleet and various 
high profile plant in the UK (e.g. Drax) experienced financial distress or bankruptcy (Joskow, 2006; Finon, 2008; 
Simshauser, 2010).   
24 See Joskow, 2006; Chao, Oren and Wilson, 2008; Meade and O’Connor, 2009; Howell, Meade and O’Connor, 
2010; Caplan, 2012; Meyer, 2012b; Nelson and Simshauser, 2013; Newbery, 2017, 2016; Grubb and Newbery, 
2018; Bublitz et al., 2019. 
25 See Chester, 2006; Anderson, Hu and Winchester, 2007; Howell, Meade and O’Connor, 2010; Simshauser, Tian 
and Whish-Wilson, 2015; Nelson et al., 2019; Simshauser, 2020. 
26 See also Green, 2006; Finon, 2008; Howell, Meade and O’Connor, 2010; Simshauser, 2010.  
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scarcity conditions, and in the short run, supply is inelastic because storage remains 
costly (Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga, 2008; Cramton and Stoft, 2008; Finon and Pignon, 
2008; Roques, 2008; Bublitz et al., 2019).27   
 
To summarise, the energy economics literature reveals electricity markets are littered 
with market frictions of the type that Williamson (1971, 1973, 1975, 1979) had 
articulated decades earlier, including high asset specificity, bounded rationality, 
asymmetric information between Generation and Retail, long asset lives, and 
unusually high financial hazards with ex-ante capital-intensive investment 
commitments (Roques, Newbery and Nuttall, 2005; Simshauser, 2010; Simshauser, 
Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015).  And as Williamson predicted, industrial organisation 
is the means by which firms navigate market frictions, market complexity and market 
imperfections.  Vertical integration has emerged as the dominant industrial form 
because the market for forward contracts is incomplete and because attempts to 
write long-dated contracts suffer from bounded rationality, asymmetric information 
and acute uncertainty given the timeframes involved vis-à-vis financing.  Ultimately, 
merchant plant entry is facilitated by vertical integration, not in spite of it.   
 
 Economies of Integration: Electricity Utilities 
As Michaels (2007), Arocena (2008) and Nillesen and Pollitt (2011) explain, when 
proposals for industry restructuring were emerging, multi-stage scope economies 
should have been of unquestionable interest but surprisingly little empirical evidence 
existed prior to the pioneering work by Kaserman and Mayo (1991).  Their analysis 
did not question competition gains but focused on the ‘cost’ component of the cost-
benefit calculus of restructuring.  Results revealed multi-stage losses from 
disaggregation being (on average) ~12% across 74 utilities.  A small but growing 
body of research ensued in two broad streams, i). cost subadditivity and coordination 
losses from disaggregation, and ii). motivations for and welfare implications of 
vertical re-aggregation vis-à-vis prices and competition.  Some have pursued both 
lines of inquiry (Kwoka and Pollitt, 2010; Meyer, 2012a, 2012b). 
 
To summarise the literature on cost subadditivity and coordination, virtually all 
studies confirm the existence of multi-stage economies (Gilsdorf, 1995; Hayashi, Goo 
and Chamberlain, 1997; Kwoka, 2002; Jara-Díaz, Ramos-Real and Martínez-Budría, 
2004; Nemoto and Goto, 2004; Fraquelli, Piacenza and Vannoni, 2005; Arocena, 
2008; Fetz and Filippini, 2010; Gugler, Liebensteiner and Schmitt, 2017).28  
Separating Generation from Networks typically results in coordination losses in the 
range of 2-10% whereas partitioning Generation from Retail produces multi-stage 
cost structure losses of 20-40% (Kwoka, 2002; Meyer, 2012b, 2012a; Gugler, 
Liebensteiner and Schmitt, 2017).29  While not contemplating electricity, the reason 
for this large permanent loss can be traced back to Carlton (1979) – vertical 
arrangements are a means by which to transfer market risks and uncertainty from 
one part of the economy to another (i.e. spot and forward markets cannot be relied 
upon to achieve the socially desirable allocation of risk and production in all 
circumstances).   
 
The second stream of literature focuses on whether mergers between Generation 
and Retail are anti-competitive or driven by transaction costs (Hogan and Meade, 
 
27 High levels of Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) amplifies and complicates matters, because historically such 
plant has been subsidised in certificate ‘side-markets’ and priority dispatched (Joskow, 2013; Newbery, 2015; 
Simshauser, 2018).   
28 Although (Gilsdorf, 1995) did not find cost complementarity, he did not preclude the presence of scope and 
integration economies (in fact several results in his study exhibited as much). 
29 Hayashi et al (1997) estimate between 14-17% gains amongst US utilities.  Kwoka (2002 p.664) estimates gains 
from Generation & Retail integration of 27-42% (median, mean) for across 147 utilities. Nemoto & Goto (2004, p.80) 
find 0.13-2.97% in Japan, Jara-Diaz et al. (2004, p.1007) find 6.5% plus market costs in Spain.  Fraquelli et al (2005, 
p.306) of 3% for the average sized Italian utility and gains of up to 40% for large operators, Arocena (2008) finds 
between 1.1-4.9% in Spain. Fetz & Filippini (2010) find vertical economies of 40%+ in Switzerland.  Gugler et al. 
(2017 p.453) find 14-51% (median, mean) across 28 European Utilities.      
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2007; Mansur, 2007; Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008; Simshauser, 2010; 
Boroumand and Zachmann, 2012; Simshauser, Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015; 
Godofredo, de Bragança and Daglish, 2017; Guo et al., 2020). Putting energy 
markets to one side, a vast literature on vertical integration across multiple industries 
exists from Malmgren (1961) with marked acceleration following Williamson (1975).  
Cooper et al.(2005), Lafontaine and Slade (2007) and Joskow (2010) provide 
extensive surveys, covering hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies and to 
summarise, the weight of empirical evidence points to material gains in consumer 
welfare including in profit-maximising vertical decisions.  Furthermore, the literature 
contains considerable evidence of adverse impacts to consumers when the practice 
is banned (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Nillesen and Pollitt, 2011).30  
Indeed, as Cooper et al. (2005) note, the striking feature of the literature is how little 
empirical evidence there is that demonstrates anti-competitive effects arise through 
vertical arrangements in competitive markets (setting to one side horizontal market 
power and bottleneck infrastructure).  Empirical studies on petrol, beer, retail, cable 
television and merchant electricity provide strong quantitative evidence that vertical 
arrangements were welfare enhancing by reducing final prices, increasing output, or 
both (Barron and Umbeck, 1984; Shepard, 1993; Mullin and Mullin, 1997; Slade, 
1998; Vita, 2000; Chipty, 2001; Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008).   
 
Reiffen and Vita (1995) considered an environment in which the primary market was 
comprised of Cournot oligopolists while the downstream market comprised a 
differentiated Bertrand duopoly31 – an analogous framework for energy markets. In 
wholesale markets, forward contract volumes are known to be extremely important 
(Allaz and Vila, 1993).  With increasing forward sales commitments generators are 
less inclined to exercise market power in spot markets (Powell, 1993; Newbery, 
1998; Green, 1999; Mansur, 2007; Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008; Gans and 
Wolak, 2011; Guo et al., 2020).  Retail markets are characterised by second- and 
third-degree price discrimination with product bundling and customer poaching.  
Armstrong (2006, 2008) provides an expansive survey of the literature on price 
discrimination under conditions of asymmetric markets and concludes where 
differential prices form a central component of final tariffs, competitive offers are 
lower when second-period commitments can be made.   
 
Consequently, vertical arrangements between Generators and Retailers create two 
forces; firm forward sales commitments (for Generation) and ability to make second-
period commitments (for Retail); from this it follows that vertical activity can be 
expected to be pro-competitive.  Empirical studies support this view.  In electricity 
markets where vertical arrangements were temporarily banned or forward 
commitments suboptimal, wholesale prices exceeded efficient levels (Newbery, 
1998; Green, 1999; Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Kahn and Joskow, 2002; 
Mansur, 2007; Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008).  Mansur 2007 and Bushnell et 
al (2007) find vertical arrangements had a clear moderating effect on wholesale 
prices in the PJM market. Analysing the New Zealand market, Hogan and Meade 
(2007) found vertical integration to be a more efficient business model through 
 
30 Lafontaine & Slade (2007, p.680) citing more than 200 sources, summarise the literature as follows: As to what the 
data reveal in relation to public policy, we did not have a particular conclusion in mind when we began to collect the 
evidence, and we have tried to be fair in presenting the empirical regularities. We are therefore somewhat surprised 
at what the weight of the evidence is telling us. It says that, under most circumstances, profit maximizing vertical-
integration decisions are efficient, not just from the firms’ but also from the consumers’ points of view. Although there 
are isolated studies that contradict this claim, the vast majority support it. Moreover, even in industries that are highly 
concentrated so that horizontal considerations assume substantial importance, the net effect of vertical integration 
appears to be positive in many instances. We therefore conclude that, faced with a vertical arrangement, the burden 
of evidence should be placed on competition authorities to demonstrate that that arrangement is harmful before the 
practice is attacked. Furthermore, we have found clear evidence that restrictions on vertical integration that are 
imposed, often by local authorities, on owners of retail networks are usually detrimental to consumers. Given the 
weight of the evidence, it behoves government agencies to reconsider the validity of such restrictions. 
31 Reiffen and Vita (1995) found downward pressure applied to final prices from eliminating double mark-ups more 
than offset the effect of higher input prices to un-integrated rivals.  They concluded vertical arrangements tend to 
increase consumer welfare. 
 Page 10 
avoided double marginalisation, with market power reduced significantly, enhanced 
wholesale market competition and lower retail prices as does Guo et al., (2020) in the 
case of China.32  In Australia’s NEM, the combined market share of the Big 3 is ~63% 
of retail and ~50% of generation but as Figure 1 illustrates, there is no evidence of 
‘withholding’ or declining forward liquidity.  Neither is there evidence of rival 
foreclosure; in 2018/19 the NEM had 35 active Retailers – up from 16 in 2006/07.33   
 
 NEM forward liquidity 1999/00-2018/19 
 
Source: Simshauser (2020) 
 
To summarise, energy markets are littered with non-trivial transaction costs.  When 
firms are confronted with transaction costs and hazards associated with asset 
specificity, bounded rationality, incomplete markets, asymmetric information and 
uncertainty – vertical integration is predictable (Williamson, 1971).  The energy 
economics literature identifies large permanent losses in multi-stage scope 
economies (c.20-40%) when Generation and Retail are partitioned.  This leads to a 
quantitative analysis of vertical integration amongst merchant utilities. 
 
3. Businesses, data and model framework 
In this research, a 3x180MW merchant Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) and a 
Retailer with 5300GWh of load (Table 1) are simulated over a 15 year period using 
historic data from the NEM’s QLD region.  The 540MW peaking Generator forms a 
small component of QLD’s 14,500MW supply-side, and the Retailer has a ~20% 
market share of the ‘mass market’ (i.e. residential and SME segments) and in 
aggregate represents less than 10% of QLD’s final energy demand of 55,000GWh 
and peak demand of 10,000MW.  Thus, neither business is dominant.  When the 
entities are subjected to an M&A event, the integrated firm will be ‘short’ baseload 
and marginally ‘long’ peaking capacity.  Details of the businesses, data and models 
are as follows. 
 
  
 
32 Gans and Wolak (2011) present one of the few dissenting views on the pro-competitive effects of vertical 
arrangements in energy market however their research focused on a passive synthetic vertical arrangement without 
control.   
33 In 2018/19, this includes the Big 3 incumbents, 29 entrants and 2 government franchises (Tasmania and regional 
QLD).  In 2006/07 there were 8 incumbents, 5 entrants and 2 government franchises. See the Australian Energy 
Regulator’s annual State of the Market reports at www.aer.gov.au  
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Table 1:   OCGT and Retailer Assumptions (2004/05) 
 
 
 Data 
In order to simulate the operations (i.e. plant dispatch, Retail portfolio hedging) and 
the financial stability (i.e. Profit & Loss, Balance Sheet, Cash Flow Statements, Asset 
Registers, Taxation Schedules, Debt Schedules) of the two businesses, data used is 
necessarily extensive and includes i). 30-minute resolution spot prices and customer 
load from AEMO, ii). traded derivatives prices (base & peak swaps, $300 caps) from 
the ASX, and daily natural gas prices from AEMO, iii). monthly average data from the 
capital markets (interest rate swaps, spreads and bond yields) from the RBA, and iv). 
annual retail customer switching rates, two-part tariffs for each segment, and 
prevailing tariff discounts (vis-à-vis price discrimination for strong and weak segment 
products) from AEMO and the QCA.34  Recall the key motivation for this research is 
whether vertical integration remains the ‘dominant form’.  Various trends in the data 
are worth highlighting. 
 
 Spot electricity prices 
Table 2 and Figure 2 present spot price data including Average Spot Prices, historic 
settlement value of $300 Caps (8th column) and the number of price spikes   
>$300 (scarcity events/market power events) in each year. 
 
Table 2:   QLD Spot Prices (2004/05 – 2018/19) 
 
Source: AEMO. 
 
For context, Figure 2 compares six-monthly average spot prices with estimated New 
Entrant Costs. 
  
 
34 AEMO is the Australian Energy Market Operator, ASX is the futures exchange, RBA is the Reserve Bank of 
Australia and QCA is the Queensland Competition Authority. 
Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) Pure Play Retailer
Unit Size (MW) 180 Customer Data
Number of Units 3 Residential Customers 288,242
Capacity (MW) 540 SME Customers 41,177
Caital Cost ($/kW) 850 Residential Load* (GWh) 2,123
Acquisition Prie ($m) 459.0 SME Load* (GWh) 910
Operations C&I Load^ (GWh) 1,452
Annual Availability (%) 94.0 Total Retail Load (GWh) 4,485
Thermal Efficiency (%) 31.9 Mass Mkt Max Demand (MW) 647
Heat Rate (GJ/MWh) 11.3 C&I Maximum Demand (MW) 285
Unit Fuel Cost* ($/GJ) 2.91 Portfolio Max Demand (MW) 778
Variable O&M ($/MWh) 3.00 Acquisition Values
Fixed O&M ($/MW/a) 10,000 Mass Market Customers (per cust) $800
Major Inspections ($m) 15.0 C&I Customers ($/MWh) 1.50
Useful Life (Yrs) 40 Acquisition Price ($m) 265.7
Taxation Life (Yrs) 30   65% of which is Goodwill ($m) 172.7
* 10 Yr Gas Supply Agreement, then spot gas prices. * Sales terms 90 days, 1% bad debts.
 ^Sales terms 30 days, 1% bad debts.
Fin Year Observations Average Spot Price
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Coefficient of 
Variation
Fair Value of 
$300 Caps
Number of Price 
Spikes > $300
(t) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh)
2004/05 17,520 28.92 109 38 1,797 3.78 3.34 42
2005/06 17,520 28.20 181 35 1,351 6.40 5.59 41
2006/07 17,520 52.34 236 26 753 4.51 9.75 132
2007/08 17,568 52.61 281 25 711 5.34 12.80 77
2008/09 17,520 34.03 106 43 2,487 3.12 2.93 35
2009/10 17,520 33.26 199 31 1,116 5.99 7.42 47
2010/11 17,520 31.66 178 37 1,528 5.63 5.26 37
2011/12 17,568 29.15 46 54 3,436 1.59 0.70 22
2012/13 17,520 67.54 126 22 657 1.86 6.13 168
2013/14 17,520 58.46 106 21 489 1.81 4.56 59
2014/15 17,520 52.79 353 26 803 6.69 18.25 106
2015/16 17,568 60.09 147 17 343 2.44 7.45 86
2016/17 17,520 93.58 331 26 848 3.53 17.75 176
2017/18 17,520 73.05 42 31 1,484 0.57 0.52 9
2018/19 17,520 80.55 39 16 866 0.48 0.20 15
Total 262,944 51.53 192 36 1,711 3.74 6.84 1,054
2020$ 59.89 8.15
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 QLD Spot Prices35 vs New Entrant Cost (2004/05 - 2018/19) 
 
Source: AEMO, (Simshauser and Gilmore, 2019) 
 
 Gas Prices 
Generation plant commences with a 10-year fixed price Gas Supply Agreement 
($2.90/GJ) as was typical in the mid-2000s.  During 2014-2016 a fleet of LNG export 
facilities were commissioned in QLD which linked NEM gas prices to seaborne 
market prices.  Consequently, the OCGT plant operates from the day-ahead gas 
market thereafter.  Gas prices are illustrated in Table 3 and Figure 3. 
 
Table 3:   QLD gas prices (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
Source: AEMO 
  
 
35 The spot price series excludes the effect of the Carbon Tax ($23/t) in 2012/13 and 2013/14. 
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2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
Price / Cost
($/MWh) Average Spot Price
New Entrant Cost
10 Year
Contract Price Spot Price Std. Dev. Coeff. Var. Max Price Min Price CCGT* OCGT^
($/GJ) ($/GJ) ($/GJ) ($/GJ) ($/GJ) ($/MWh) ($/MWh)
2004/05 2.93 8.38 1.21
2005/06 3.01 7.10 7.94
2006/07 3.13 30.44 39.81
2007/08 3.24 29.96 32.11
2008/09 3.38 10.35 7.40
2009/10 3.46 9.02 9.92
2010/11 3.57 6.64 3.21
2011/12 3.67 3.59 0.71 0.20 5.65 2.60 4.00 -6.55 
2012/13 3.73 5.92 1.53 0.26 12.90 3.62 26.12 8.17
2013/14 3.82 4.55 1.18 0.26 8.38 2.05 26.64 11.23
2014/15 2.28 2.15 0.95 29.90 0.00 36.86 42.07
2015/16 4.65 1.80 0.39 11.95 0.55 27.56 16.44
2016/17 8.19 2.48 0.30 16.50 3.41 36.22 19.00
2017/18 7.45 1.12 0.15 14.11 5.39 20.89 -6.06 
2018/19 9.41 0.80 0.08 11.50 6.56 14.66 -18.85 
* CCGT Spark Spread: Average Annual Spot Price - (Gas Price x CCGT Heat Rate 7GJ/MWh). Gas spot prices used from 2011/12.
 ^OCGT Spark Spread: Average Annual Peak Spot Price - (Gas Price x CCGT Heat Rate 11.3 GJ/MWh). Gas spot prices used from 2011/12.
Brisbane Short Term Trading Market Spark Spread
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 QLD gas prices (2004/05 – 2018/19) 
 
Source: GMAT 
 
 Forward Prices 
Forward prices for the three most commonly traded derivative instruments (base 
swaps, peak swaps, $300 caps) have been drawn from futures market data.  An 
overview of the data is presented in Table 4.  Box A of Table 4 shows base prices.  
Note spot prices have 262,944 observations (i.e. 30 minute data over 15 years) with 
an average annual price of $51.53/MWh in nominal terms.  Swaps data includes 
16,919 days of trades (i.e. each business day over the period 2002-2019, noting that 
swaps for 2005 delivery commence trade three years prior, in 2002) and exhibit an 
overall average price of $52.29 in nominal terms.  The ‘Portfolio’ result has 15 
observations (i.e. one for each year of this study) with an average price of 
$50.65/MWh and represents an ‘accumulated portfolio’ of derivative instruments.36   
 
Table 4:   Base, Peak and $300 Cap Prices (2005-2019) 
 
Source: AEMO, ASX. 
 
Daily resolution, run-of-trade prices for Baseload Swaps and $300 Caps (2005-2020 
vintages) and the constructed Swap and Cap portfolio prices (solid black line series) 
are presented in Figures 4 and 5 respectively.   
  
 
36 Specifically, the accumulated portfolio involves progressively layering in base swaps into a portfolio over the three-
year period leading up to real-time at the pre-set /vanilla hedge portfolio ratio of 20%, 35% and 45% in years n-3, n-2 
and n-1 respectively.  The same process applies to peak swaps and $300 caps. 
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Unit Gas Price
($/GJ)
Spot Price 
(Brisbane)
LNG Exports 
Commence
10 Yr Gas Supply 
Agreement
Export Parity 
Price Range
Spot Swaps Portfolio Spot Swaps Portfolio Spot >300 $300 Caps Portfolio
Observations 262,944 16,919 15 143,820 16,919 15 262,944 13,123 15
Average ($/MWh) 51.53 52.29 50.39 62.60 69.38 68.63 6.84 8.62 9.56
Std Deviation ($/MWh) 20.78 14.88 11.85 21.48 18.03 12.24 5.69 4.04 2.25
Coeff. Variation 0.40 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.26 0.18 0.83 0.47 0.24
Min ($/MWh) 28.20 19.40 34.46 33.92 22.50 48.63 0.20 0.05 6.88
Max ($/MWh) 93.58 129.44 72.28 110.97 178.42 88.40 18.25 34.10 13.96
Box A:  Base Prices Box B: Peak Prices Box C:  $300 Cap Prices
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 Baseload Swap Prices (2005-2019, nominal dollars) 
 
Source: ASX. 
 
 $300 Cap prices (2005-2019, nominal dollars) 
 
Source: ASX. 
 
  Retail Tariffs, Discounts & Switching Rates 
For context, the history of QLD Residential Tariffs (1954/55-2018/19) are presented 
in Figure 6.  The period of this research (i.e. dark blue bars, 2004/05-2018/19) is 
characterised by steep rises, particularly over the period 2006/07-2014/15.  A  sharp 
run-up in network tariffs, from ~5.5c/kWh to 15+c/kWh in 2015 before falling back to 
11.5c/kWh in 2019 was the main driver of prices changes.  While network tariffs 
contracted over the period 2016-2019, wholesale prices surged and offset network 
savings. These  tariff increases combined with generous Feed-in Tariffs and falling 
solar PV installation costs led to world-leading rooftop solar PV installation rates – 
the impact of which is subsequently revealed in Figures 9-10. 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Price 
($/MWh) Portfolio Price 2005 2006 2007
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013 2014 2015
2016 2017 2018 2019
2020
0
5
10
15
20
25
Price 
($/MWh) Portfolio Price 2005 2006 2007
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013 2014 2015
2016 2017 2018 2019
2020
 Page 15 
 QLD Residential Tariffs (1955-2019) 
 
Source: ESAA, QCA, ABS. 
 
Full Retail Competition did not commence in QLD until 2007.  From the outset of 
contestability, customer switching rates averaged 21.4% per annum.  A series of 
capricious regulatory decisions from 2011-2013 reduced Retail profits, damaged 
competition (i.e. 2nd tier Retailers exiting), compressed discounting – all of which 
lowered customer switching rates (Simshauser, 2018).  The market was deregulated 
in 2016 following which competition increased along with the level of discounting.  
For modelling purposes strong and weak segment tariffs and customer numbers are 
combined to a blended average.37  
 
 Residential tariffs, switching rates & tariff discounts  
 
Source: QCA, AEMO, AER. 
 
 Retail Load 
Table 5 and Figure 8 provide an overview of Retail load, split by Mass Market and 
Commercial & Industrial segments.  Average Residential Load (column 4) rises from 
7,366 to 7,824kWh by 2009/10, then declines to 5,598kWh by 2018/19.  The driver of 
 
37 The two-year average customer switching rate from Figure 7 is multiplied by prevailing tariff discounts in Figure 7, 
with this result deducted from the Default Tariff.  This has the effect of capturing the average price sold to both strong 
and weak retail segments based on an implicit assumption that discounted contracts have a two-year duration – after 
which the customer reverts to the Default Tariff. 
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the initial rise in load is uptake of air-conditioning units, while the decline is driven by 
the uptake of solar PV.38 
 
Table 5:   Retail Customer Load (2004/05-2018-19) 
 
Sources: ESAA, AEC, AEMO, QCA. 
 
 
 Retail Customer Load (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
 
The striking feature of the customer book is the ‘twisting’ load shape and load factor 
deterioration over time.  Underpinning this are profound impacts of rooftop solar PV 
systems on the relative shape of Mass Market load, illustrated in Figures 9-10 for 
summer and winter.  Note the hollowing out of load during daylight hours to 2018/19 
– winter being particularly pronounced given typically mild daytime weather 
conditions in QLD. 
 
  
 
38 In QLD, the take-up rate of air conditioning units in 1998 was ~23% but this had risen to 72% in 2010.  Similarly, 
installations of solar PV prior to 2008 was negligible but by 2020 was estimated to be 35.7% of dwellings (see QLD 
data at https://pv-map.apvi.org.au/historical). 
Fin Year Observations
Mass Market* 
Customer 
Numbers^
Average 
Residential 
Load*
Total Mass 
Market Energy 
Demand
Commercial & 
Industrial 
Demand
Portfolio Energy 
Demand
Portfolio 
Maximum 
Demand
Portfolio Load 
Factor
(t) (kWh) (GWh) (GWh) (GWh) (MW)
2004/05 17520 329,419 7,366 3,033 1,452 4,485 778 0.66
2005/06 17520 334,943 7,767 3,252 1,474 4,726 871 0.62
2006/07 17520 339,804 7,519 3,194 1,473 4,667 860 0.62
2007/08 17568 347,263 7,210 3,130 1,474 4,603 863 0.61
2008/09 17520 352,325 7,464 3,287 1,549 4,836 937 0.59
2009/10 17520 360,332 7,824 3,524 1,707 5,231 1,014 0.59
2010/11 17520 365,196 7,410 3,383 1,589 4,971 983 0.58
2011/12 17568 372,261 6,497 3,023 1,440 4,463 903 0.56
2012/13 17520 378,872 6,219 2,945 1,341 4,286 878 0.56
2013/14 17520 382,051 6,280 2,999 1,367 4,366 996 0.50
2014/15 17520 387,671 6,053 2,933 1,276 4,209 950 0.51
2015/16 17568 393,499 5,939 2,921 1,213 4,134 938 0.50
2016/17 17520 399,005 5,947 2,966 1,213 4,179 1,064 0.45
2017/18 17520 405,796 5,699 2,891 1,196 4,087 1,046 0.45
2018/19 17520 419,234 5,598 2,934 1,213 4,147 1,085 0.44
* Mass Market comprises Residential Households and the SME sector. The average SME customer is 3x the size of the average Residential household.
 ^Residential customer numbers commence at 288,242 and SME customer numbers commence at 41,177.
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 Mass Market Average Summer & Winter Load (2004/05 – 2018/19) 
 
 
 
 Modelling Framework 
Three sequential models are used, i). Unit Commitment Model for Generation, ii) 
Retail Portfolio Model, and iii). Dynamic Financial Model.  The Unit Commitment and 
Retail Portfolio Models are operational in nature and computationally intensive given 
30-minute resolution over 15 years.  30-minute results are rolled-up into Quarterly 
outputs and fed into the Dynamic Financial Model, which ultimately produces the 
Financial Results on an Annual basis.  
 
 Unit Commitment Model  
The Unit Commitment Model simulates plant dispatch for each of the 262,944 trading 
intervals over the period 2004/05-2018/19.  The Model’s objective function is to 
maximise spread options inherent in spot electricity and gas prices, subject to various 
OCGT constraints and non-convexities.  Essential model inputs include OCGT 
technical and financial data (Table 1), 30-minute spot prices and daily spot gas prices 
(Figures 2-3).  Model structure is as follows: 
 
Let Y be the ordered set of Years. 
 
𝑛 ∈ {1. . |𝑌|} ∧ 𝑦𝑛 ∈ 𝑌,        (1) 
 
Let H be the ordered set of Half-Hour trading intervals in each year 𝑛. 
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𝑡 ∈ {1. . |𝐻|} ∧ ℎ𝑡 ∈ 𝐻,        (2) 
 
Let ?̅? be the ordered set of gas turbine units at maximum continuous rating, ?̅?𝑗. 
 
𝑗 ∈ {1. . |?̅?|} ∧ ?̅?𝑗 ∈ ?̅?,         (3) 
 
Marginal Running Costs include Fuel 𝐹(𝑔𝑗𝑡) and Variable Operations & Maintenance 
costs (𝑉𝑂𝑀𝑗𝑡).  𝐹(𝑔𝑗𝑡) is non-convex because of start-up quantity 𝑎𝑗 with marginal fuel 
consumed at the plant’s heat rate ℎ𝑗.  Each coefficient is strictly non-negative. 𝑝𝐹𝑡  is 
the price of Fuel. Once operational, 𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑗𝑡 reduces because Fuel consumed during 
the start-up sequence (𝑎𝑗) is sunk.   
 
∃ ?̅?𝑗|𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑗
𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑔𝑗
𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝐹
𝑡 + 𝑔𝑗
𝑡 ∙ 𝑉𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑡 | 𝐹(𝑔𝑗
𝑡) = 𝑖𝑓 {
𝑔𝑗
𝑡−1 = 0, 𝑎𝑗 + ℎ𝑗 ∙ 𝑔𝑗
𝑡
𝑔𝑗
𝑡−1 > 0, ℎ𝑗 ∙ 𝑔𝑗
𝑡,
  (4) 
 
Following unit commitment, quantity generated 𝑔𝑗𝑡 is bounded by maximum rated 
capacity ?̅?𝑗 and minimum stable load 𝑔𝑗. 
 
𝑔𝐽 < 𝑔𝑗
𝑡 < ?̅?𝑗 ∀ 𝑔𝑗
𝑡 > 0,       (5) 
   
Plant is subject to annual planned outages of one week (𝑜𝑗,𝑢𝑡 ), periodic Major 
Inspections of one month, and forced outages of 6% (𝛼𝑗,𝑢𝑡 ) per annum.  Planned 
outages are pre-scheduled in mild seasons.   Forced outages (including failed starts) 
are random, occurring throughout the year. Available capacity is therefore stochastic 
and modelled at the station level for each trading interval: 
 
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑡|?̅?|
𝑗=1 | 𝑖𝑓 {
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑[0. .1] < 𝛼𝑗,𝑢
𝑡 ⋀ 𝑡 ≠ 𝑜𝑗,𝑢
𝑡 , 𝑔𝑗
𝑡
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑[0. .1] ≥ 𝛼𝑗,𝑢
𝑡 ⋁ 𝑡 =  𝑜𝑗,𝑢
𝑡 , 0,
     (6) 
 
Gas turbines are subject to a start-up sequence(𝛾𝑗) which means maximum output in 
the first trading interval following unit commitment is not feasible: 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑒
𝑡 > 𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑗
𝑡 ∧ 𝑔𝑗
𝑡−1 {
= 0, (𝛾𝑗 ∙ 𝑔
𝑡
) 
≠ 0, 𝑔
𝑡
,                    
     (7) 
 
Gas turbines have practical minimum economic run-times.  Unit commitment is 
subject to expected electricity prices 𝑝𝑒𝑡 over a look-ahead period (𝜃) set to four 
hours to ensure units are not started for brief periods of marginal value.39  
Conversely, if already operational and marginal value is expected, units remain in 
service: 
 
𝑔𝑗
𝑡 = 𝑖𝑓 {
∑
𝑝𝑒
𝑡
𝜃
𝑡+𝜃
t  ≥ MRC𝑗
𝑡, 𝑔
𝑡
         
𝑔𝑡−1 > 0 ∧ 𝑝𝑒
𝑡 ≥ MRC𝑗
𝑡, 𝑔
𝑡
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 0,                     
      (8) 
 
 
39 The consequence of Eq.(8) is that the station will sometimes start early in anticipation of a major price spike 
thereby capturing realistic behaviour under uncertainty, and may not generate during brief spikes of low profitability 
thereby avoiding unnecessary operating hours and/or unit starts.  However, subject to Eq.(6) unit commitment will 
capture major price spikes reflecting an assumption of high quality short-term price forecasting. 
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In the present exercise, key financial and operational outputs for each trading interval 
t in each year n are extracted and rolled-up into an ordered set of quarterly and 
annual results (𝑛 = 15). 
 
Generation revenue for year n (𝑅𝐺𝑛) is calculated as the sum of spot revenues, Cap 
sales less Contract-for-Difference payments on Caps: 
 
𝑅𝐺
𝑛 = ∑ ∑ (𝑔𝑗
𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑒
𝑡  ∙ 𝑇)
|𝐻|
𝑡=1
|𝐺|
𝑗=1 + ∑ [(𝑣𝑐
𝑛 ∙ 𝑝𝑐
𝑛  ∙ 𝑇) − (𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑝𝑒
𝑡 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 𝑣𝑐
𝑛 ∙ 𝑇)]
|𝐻|
𝑡=1  (9) 
 
where 
 𝑣𝑐𝑛   = volume of Caps (MW)  
 p𝑐𝑛   = price of Caps ($/MWh) 
 𝑇   = duration of each time period t (in hours) 
 𝑝𝑠   = strike price of Cap ($/MWh) 
 
Generation plant Marginal Running Costs for year n (𝑀𝑅𝐶𝐺𝑛) is calculated as the sum 
of start-up fuel, fuel used during operations and VOM.   
 
𝑀𝑅𝐶𝐺
𝑛 = ∑ ∑ [(𝑠𝑗
𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑗 + ℎ𝑗 ∙ 𝑔𝑗
𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝐹
𝑡 + (𝑉𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑡 ∙ 𝑔𝑗
𝑡)]
|𝐻|
𝑡=1
|𝐺|
𝑗=1 |𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑗
𝑡 =
{
1, 𝑔𝑗
𝑡 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑗
𝑡−1 = 0
0,                                        
,       (10) 
 
where 
 𝑠𝑗𝑡 = unit starts in each dispatch interval for each unit, j 
 
 Retail Load Model 
The Retail Load Model produces the Retailer’s annual revenues and Wholesale 
Energy Costs for the 262,944 30-minute trading intervals from 2004/05-2018/19.  
Model structure is as follows: 
 
Let 𝛹 be the ordered set of customer segments in the portfolio. 
 
𝑘 ∈ 1. . |𝛹| ∧ 𝜓𝑘 ∈ 𝛹 ∧ ∀k,m|k ≠ m, k ≠ u,m ≠ u:𝜓𝑘 ∩ 𝜓𝑚 = {},  (11) 
 
Let Ω be the ordered set of customers within each customer segment: 
 
𝑤 ∈ {1… |Ω|} ∧ 𝜔𝑤 ∈ Ω,       (12) 
 
For each year n, Retailer Revenues 𝑅𝑅𝑛 are calculated as follows:   
 
𝑅𝑅
𝑛 = [∑ ∑ (𝛤𝑓
𝑘,𝑛 ∙ 𝑑𝑛)Ω𝑤=1
|𝛹|
𝑘=1 ] + [∑ ∑ (𝛤𝑟
𝑘,𝑛 ⋅ 𝑙𝑡
𝑘 ∙ (1 − 𝛿𝑘,𝑛))
|𝐻|
𝑡=1
|𝛹|
𝑘=1 ],  (13) 
 
Where 
𝛤𝑓
𝑘,𝑛  = Tariff daily fixed charge for customer segment k 
𝑑𝑛   = the number of billing days 
𝛤𝑟
𝑘,𝑛  = Tariff variable rate for customer segment k 
𝑙𝑡
𝑘  = customer segment k’s load in trading interval t  
𝛿𝑘,𝑛  = weighted average market contract discounts 
 
Wholesale Energy Costs (𝑊𝑛) comprise spot market purchases and difference 
payments on financial instruments (base swaps, peak swaps and caps) and are 
calculated as follows: 
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𝑊𝑛 = ∑ [𝑝𝑒
𝑡 ∙ ∑ 𝑙𝜓
𝑡𝛹
𝑘=1  ∙ 𝑇]
𝐻
𝑡=1 + ∑ [(𝑝𝑒
𝑡 − 𝑝𝑏
𝑡 ) ∙ 𝑣𝑏
𝑡 ∙ 𝑇]𝐻𝑡=1 + ∑ [(𝑝𝑒
𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝
𝑡 ) ∙ 𝑣𝑝𝑛 ∙ 𝑇]𝐻𝑡=1 + ∑ [−𝑝𝑐
𝑛 ∙ 𝑣𝑐𝑛 +𝐻𝑡=1
(𝑝𝑒
𝑡 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 𝑣𝑐
𝑛 ∙ 𝑇],         (14) 
 
where 
 𝑣𝑙𝑡   = aggregate customer load (MW) in trading interval (t) 
 𝑣𝑏𝑡 , 𝑣𝑝𝑡    = volume of base swaps and peak swaps (MW) 
 𝑝𝑏𝑡 , 𝑝𝑝𝑡    = price of base swaps and peak swaps ($/MWh) 
 
 Dynamic Financial Model  
The Dynamic Financial Model produces a comprehensive set of financial statements 
(Profit & Loss, Balance Sheet, Cash Flow, Taxation Schedule, Debt Facility module 
for corporate debt and for Project Finance).  Outputs from the Unit Commitment 
Model and Retail Load Model feed directly into the Financial Model at Quarterly 
resolution.  Financial Model produces both Quarterly and Annual results.  Let ?̅? be 
the ordered set of business combinations. 
 
𝛽 ∈ {1. . |?̅?|} ∧ ?̅?𝛽 ∈ ?̅?, ⋀𝛽 = {𝐺, 𝑅, 𝑉𝐼}|𝐺 ∩ 𝑅 = {}⋀𝑉𝐼 = 𝐺⋃𝑅,   (15) 
 
• Generation Profit & Loss 
 
Π𝐺
𝑛 = (𝑅𝐺
𝑛 −𝑀𝑅𝐶𝐺
𝑛 − 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐺
𝑛 − 𝑑𝐺
𝑛 − 𝐼𝐺
𝑛 − 𝜏𝐺
𝑛)⋀𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐺
𝑛 = (𝑅𝐺
𝑛 −𝑀𝑅𝐶𝐺
𝑛 − 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐺
𝑛), 
          (16) 
where 
 Π𝐺𝑛  = Profit function or Net Profit After Tax (NPAT) 
 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐺𝑛  = Fixed Operations & Maintenance 
 𝑑𝐺𝑛  = Depreciation & Amortisation 
 𝐼𝐺𝑛  = Financing costs 
 𝜏𝐺𝑛  = Taxation 
 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑛 = Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation & Amortisation  
 
• Retail Profit & Loss 
 
Π𝑅
𝑛 = (𝑅𝑅
𝑛 −𝑊𝑛 − 𝑂𝐸𝑛 − 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑛 − 𝑑𝑅
𝑛 − 𝐼𝑅
𝑛 − 𝜏𝑅
𝑛)⋀𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑅
𝑛 = (𝑅𝑅
𝑛 −𝑊𝑛 − 𝑂𝐸𝑛 −
 𝑁𝑛 − 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑛),         (17) 
 
Where 
𝑂𝐸𝑛  = Other Energy Costs relating to wholesale markets40 
𝑁𝑛  = Network charges 
 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑛  = Retail Operating Costs41 
 
If profits are made, dividend payout ratio (𝐷𝑃𝑅𝛽) is:  
 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝛽 = 𝑖𝑓Π𝛽
𝑛 {
> 0, Π𝛽
𝑛 ∙ 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝛽
< 0, 0               ,
       (18)    
 
 
• Depreciation & Amortisation  
In order to determine values for 𝑑𝛽𝑛, 𝐼𝛽𝑛 and 𝜏𝛽𝑛, Asset Values (i.e. Capital Costs) first 
need to be defined for Generation (𝑋𝐺𝑛=0) and Retail (𝑋𝑅𝑛=0).  Upfront and ongoing 
 
40 These include including renewable program subsidies, technology set-side schemes, carbon taxes, rooftop solar 
PV Feed-in Tariff Subsidies, Frequency Control Ancillary Services, Market Operator Fees and transmission system 
losses. In 2004/05 these costs collectively added to $6.78/MWh and by 2018/19 had risen to $31.07/MWh.   80% of 
the cost increases related to renewable program subsidies (refer Fig.6) with the balance being largely in line with 
inflation. 
41 These include Retail Operating Costs ($/customer), Marketing Costs (including Customer Retention and 
Acquisition costs, $/customer), and General & Administrative expenses.  Bad debts are also included, at 1% of sales 
per annum. 
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Capital costs (𝑋𝛽𝑛, 𝑥𝛽𝑛) give rise to tax depreciation (𝑑𝛽𝑖 ) such that if the current period 
was greater than the plant life under taxation law (L), then the value is 0: 
 
𝑑𝐺
𝑛 = (
𝑋𝐺
𝑛=0
𝐿
) + (
∑ 𝑥𝐺
𝑛|𝑌|
𝑛=1
∑ 𝐿−(𝑛−1)
|𝑌|
𝑛=1
) ⋀𝑑𝑅
𝑛 = (
(1−𝑔𝑤𝑅)∙𝑋𝑅
𝑛=0
𝐿
) + (
∑ 𝑥𝑅
𝑛|𝑌|
𝑛=1
∑ 𝐿−(𝑛−1)
|𝑌|
𝑛=1
) ,  (19) 
 
Where  
 𝑔𝑤𝑅 is assets ascribed to Goodwill and is not depreciable. 
 
• Taxation 
Taxation (𝜏𝛽𝑛) payable at the corporate taxation rate (𝜏𝑐) is applied to  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝛽𝑛 less 
Interest (𝐼𝛽𝑛) later defined, less 𝑑𝛽𝑛.  To the extent (𝜏𝛽𝑛) results in non-positive 
outcome, tax losses (?̅?𝛽𝑛) are carried forward and offset against future periods. 
 
𝜏𝛽
𝑛 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, ( 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝛽
𝑛 − 𝐼𝛽
𝑛 − 𝑑𝛽
𝑛 − ?̅?𝛽
𝑛−1). 𝜏𝑐)    (20) 
 
?̅?𝛽
𝑛 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛(0, ( 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝛽
𝑛 − 𝐼𝛽
𝑛 − 𝑑𝛽
𝑛 − ?̅?𝛽
𝑛−1). 𝜏𝑐)    (21) 
 
• Debt Structuring 
The debt financing module computes interest and principal repayments on different 
debt facilities depending on the type, structure and tenor of tranches.  Two types 
exist (a) BBB-rated Corporate Facilities (CF) (i.e. balance-sheet financings) and (2) 
Project Financings (PF).  Two structures exist – ‘A’ and ‘B’ Facilities (‘Bullet’ and 
‘Amortising’, respectively), ‘A’ being semi-permanent with a nominal repayment tenor 
of 25 years.  The decision tree for the two tranches of debt is the same, so for the 
Debt Tranche where 𝐷𝑇 = 1 or 2, the calculation is as follows: 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑛 {
> 1,𝐷𝑇𝛽
𝑛 = 𝐷𝑇𝛽
𝑛−1 − 𝑃𝛽
𝑛−1
= 1,𝐷𝑇𝛽
1 = 𝐷𝛽
0. Φ                  
      (22) 
 
𝐷𝛽
0 refers to the total amount of debt used in the project.  The split (Φ) of debt 
between Facilities refers to the manner in which debt is apportioned to each Tranche.  
In the model, 35% of debt is assigned to Tranche 1.  Principal 𝑃𝛽𝑛−1 refers to the 
amount of principal repayment for tranche DT in period n and is calculated as an 
annuity: 
 
𝑃𝛽
𝑛 = (
𝐷𝑇𝛽
𝑛
[
1−(1+(𝑅𝑇𝛽
𝑧 +𝐶𝑇𝛽
𝑧 ))−𝑛
𝑅𝑇𝛽
𝑧 +𝐶𝑇𝛽
𝑧 ]
|𝑧 {
= 𝐶𝐹
= 𝑃𝐹
)      (23) 
 
In (23), 𝑅𝑇𝛽 is the relevant interest rate swap and 𝐶𝑇𝛽 is the credit spread or margin 
relevant to the issued Debt Tranche.  Interest costs (𝐼𝛽𝑛) are calculated as the 
product of the (fixed) interest rate on the loan by the amount of loan outstanding: 
 
𝐼𝛽
𝑛 = 𝐷𝑇𝛽
𝑛 × (𝑅𝑇𝛽
𝑧 + 𝐶𝑇𝛽
𝑧 )       (24) 
 
Total Debt outstanding 𝐷𝛽𝑛, total Interest 𝐼𝛽𝑛  and total Principle 𝑃𝛽𝑛 are calculated as 
the sum of the above components for the two debt Tranches.  For clarity, Loan 
Drawings are equal to 𝐷0𝑛 in year 0 to form the initial financing.   
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• Debt Sizing 
One of the key calculations is the derivation of 𝐷𝛽0.  This is determined by the product 
of the gearing level and the initial Capital Cost (𝑋𝛽𝑛=0).  Gearing levels are formed by 
applying a cash flow constraint based on credit metrics applied by capital markets 
and project banks for CF (i.e. BBB corporate) and PF (i.e. Project Finance), 
respectively: 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝛽
{
 
 = 𝐶𝐹,𝑀𝑖𝑛 (
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝛽
𝑛
𝐼𝛽
𝑛 ) ≥ ℂ𝐶𝐹
𝑛 ⋀𝑀𝑖𝑛 ( 
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝛽
𝑛
𝐷𝛽
𝑛 ) ≥ ℊ𝐶𝐹
𝑛 ∀𝑛 |𝐹𝐹𝑂𝛽
𝑛 = (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝛽
𝑛 − 𝐼𝛽
𝑛 − 𝜏𝛽
𝑛 − 𝑑𝑊𝐶𝛽
𝑛 − 𝑥𝛽
𝑛)
= 𝑃𝐹,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝐺
𝑛) ≥ ℂ𝑃𝐹
𝑛 , ∀𝑛 |𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝐺 =
(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐺
𝑛−𝑥𝐺
𝑛−𝜏𝐺
𝑛)
𝑃𝐺
𝑛+𝐼𝐺
𝑛      ,                                                                            
(25) 
 
Where 
 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝛽𝑛  = Funds From Operations (a Ratings Agency metric) 
 ℂ𝐶𝐹𝑛 , ℊ𝐶𝐹𝑛 ,ℂ𝑃𝐹𝑛  = Credit Metrics (Ratings Agencies & Project Banks) 
 𝑊𝐶𝛽𝑛  = Working Capital (i.e. Cash, Receivables, Deposits, Payables) 
 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝐺𝑛  = Debt Service Cover Ratio (Project Finance)  
 
• Cash Flow Statement 
Net Cash Flows are comprised of Cash Flows from Operations (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝛽𝑛), Investing 
(𝐶𝐹𝐼𝛽
𝑛) and Financing (𝐶𝐹𝐹𝛽𝑛) activities: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝐼𝛽
𝑛 = 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝛽
𝑛 + 𝐶𝐹𝐼𝛽
𝑛 + 𝐶𝐹𝐹𝛽
𝑛|𝐶𝐹𝑂𝛽
𝑛 = 𝑅𝛽
𝑛 − (𝐶𝛽
𝑛 + 𝑑𝑊𝐶𝛽
𝑛 + 𝐼𝛽
𝑛 + 𝜏𝛽
𝑛)⋀𝐶𝐹𝐼𝛽
𝑛 = (𝑋𝛽
𝑛 +
 𝑥𝛽
𝑛)⋀ 𝐶𝐹𝐹𝛽
𝑛 = 𝐸𝛽
𝑛 + 𝐷𝛽
𝑛 − 𝑃𝛽
𝑛 − 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝛽 ,      (26) 
 
where: 
 𝐶𝛽𝑛 = are Cash Operating Costs (𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑄𝑛, 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑄𝑛,𝑊𝑛, 𝑂𝐸𝑛, 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑛)  
   𝐸𝛽𝑛 = Funds from the issue of Equities 
 
• Balance Sheet 
Current and Non-Current Assets (𝐶𝐴𝛽𝑛, 𝑁𝐶𝐴𝛽𝑛) and Current and Non-Current 
Liabilities (𝐶𝐿𝛽𝑛 , 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝛽𝑛) are as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝛽
𝑛 = 𝐶𝐹𝐹𝛽
𝑛 + 𝐴𝑅𝛽
𝑛 + 𝐶𝐷𝛽
𝑛 ∧ 𝑁𝐶𝐴𝛽
𝑛 = 𝑋𝐺
𝑛=0 + (𝑔𝑤𝑅 ⋅ 𝑋𝑅
𝑛=0) + ∑ 𝑥𝛽
𝑛|𝑌|
𝑛=1 − ∑ 𝑑𝛽
𝑛|𝑌|
𝑛=1 +
[(1 − 𝑔𝑤𝑅) ∙ 𝑋𝑅
𝑛=0]         (27) 
 
𝐶𝐿𝛽
𝑛 = 𝐴𝑅𝛽
𝑛 + (𝑃𝛽
𝑛+1 + 𝐼𝛽
𝑛 4⁄ ) + 𝜏𝛽
𝑛 ∧ 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝛽
𝑛 = (𝐷𝛽
𝑛 − 𝑃𝛽
𝑛+1)   (28) 
 
Where: 
 𝐴𝑅𝛽𝑛 = Receivables42 
 𝐶𝐷𝛽𝑛 = Market Prudential Deposits43 
 𝐴𝑃𝛽𝑛 = Payables44 
 
And therefore Equity (𝐸𝑄𝛽𝑛) is: 
 
𝐸𝑄𝛽
𝑛 = ∑(𝐶𝐴𝛽
𝑛, 𝑁𝐶𝐴𝛽
𝑛 , 𝐶𝐿𝛽
𝑛 , 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝛽
𝑛) + (∑ Π𝛽
𝑛|𝑌|
𝑛=1 −∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝛽
𝑛|𝑌|
𝑛=1 )   (29) 
 
42 Receivables are 90 days for Mass Market Sales and 30 days of C&I Sales, and 42 days for Wholesale Markets 
transactions.   
43 AEMO Deposits are calculated per the NEM Rules, (i.e. equivalent to the worst 42 days of spot market trade given 
current volume exposures).   
44 Payables include 30-day terms for Network Costs, all other Fixed Costs and 42 days for Wholesale Markets 
transactions. 
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4. Model Results 
Combining data and models from Section 3 enables a set of Revenues, Costs and 
Capital to be produced for three businesses (i.e. Generator, Retailer, Merged entity). 
The objective of this research is to analyse two key parameters, viz. i). the extent to 
which costs of the firms are sub-additive, and ii). the financial stability of firms, 
pre/post boundary changes.  In all scenarios, a Retail hedging45 structure of ‘swap to 
average, cap to maximum’ is deployed, noting this is not ex post optimal but a 
reasonable ex ante vanilla trading strategy, uniformly applied regardless of firm 
boundaries.46 
 
 Project Financed Merchant Power Producer  
It is worth reviewing the project financed Merchant Power Producer to illustrate 
‘bankability’ or lack thereof (recall Section 2.3).  Table 6 presents data necessary to 
construct a Project Financing based on parameters relevant in 2005 (re-financings in 
200947 and 2016).      
 
Table 6:   Merchant OCGT Project Financing 
 
Sources: RBA, (Simshauser, 2009; Simshauser and Gilmore, 2019) 
 
Initial debt sizing is based on Cap prices of $8.28/MWh prevailing in 2004/05 (Fig.5), 
Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR) of 1.8x, and 12-Year Amortising (Term Loan A) 
and 7-Year Bullet (Term Loan B) Facilities set in semi-permanent structures with a 
notional 25-year tenor.  On this basis, debt-sizing (Eq.25) for the 540MW OCGT plant 
is $303m or 62% debt (total asset base: $487m).  This results in an ex ante minimum 
expected DSCR of 1.80, estimated post-tax equity IRR of ~14%, and running cash 
yield to equity of ~12.5%.48 
 
Figure 10 illustrates how such a plant would have performed ex post, using historic 
market data.  The plant produces positive cumulative Net Cash Flows (bar chart, 
RHS Axis) with an average running yield of 8.5% (400bps below the ~12.5% 
benchmark) and overall average DSCR of 1.59x (vs. initial debt sizing of 1.80x 
minimum, and overall average of ~1.92).  Plant underpinned by spot and short term 
forward revenues proves too volatile for a Project Finance – with four static 
insolvency events (Bank Covenant ‘Default’ DSCR < 1.10) and three static episodes 
of financial distress (Bank Covenant ‘Lockup’ DSCR < 1.35) as highlighted by the red 
circles in Fig.10.49   
  
 
45 Recall that the hedge portfolio is accumulated over a three-year window (Quarterly quantity resolution, settled 
every 30 minutes). 
46 To the extent that any profit improvement (or consequential loss) could be initiated by active trader intervention, 
such gains/losses would also apply to all business combinations in a largely uniform manner.   
47 The refinancing of Term Loan B in 2009 occurs during good electricity market conditions but very tough capital 
markets conditions (i.e. immediate post-GFC).  The facility is assumed to be refinanced for a further 5 years, and 
refinanced again in 2015 (with the headline interest rate having fallen by a factor of 2, i.e. from 10.4% to 5.0%). 
48 That is, after taking the 2004/05 Cap price and projecting forward at CPI. 
49 Of course in practice, neither event can be taken as ‘static’.  Financial distress events extend until a full year of 
covenant compliance has been met, and an insolvency event requires an equity cure, asset sale or reorganisation of 
debt. 
Project Finance Debt Sizing Parameters
  - Post Tax Equity (Er) (%) 12.00         - DSCR (times) 1.80         
Interest Rates in 2004   - Lockup (times) 1.35         
  - Term Loan A 12Yr Swap (%) 6.18           - Default (times) 1.10         
  - Term Loan A Spread (bps) 180            - Term Loan A (Yrs) 12            
  - Term Loan B 5Yr Swap (%) 5.97           - Term Loan B (Yrs) 5              
  - Term Loan B Spread (bps) 140            - Notional amortisation (Yrs) 25            
Refinancings
  - Term Loan A Refi Yr 2009   - Term Loan B Refi Yr 2016
  - Term Loan A Swap (%) 5.83           - Term Loan B Swap (%) 2.52         
  - Term Loan A Spread (bps) 457            - Term Loan B Spread (bps) 213          
 Page 24 
 Project Financed Merchant OCGT Plant (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
 
Financial distress events are driven by the combination of price cycles50 (Fig.2, Fig.5) 
and operating leverage – the latter a result of the high gearing associated with 
Project Finance.  A different capital structure comprised of corporate finance at 
gearing levels consistent with investment grade metrics (i.e. ~30% debt) will produce 
a more tractable set of business results with the amplifying effects of high operating 
leverage removed, as Section 4.2 demonstrates. 
 
 Stand-alone Generator (Corporate Finance) 
Changing the capital structure from Project to Corporate Finance does nothing to 
subdue pre-finance earnings volatility, but lower gearing does eliminate insolvency 
events.  Figure 11 presents annual Revenues (solid line series), Costs (stacked-bar 
series) and Funds From Operations or “FFO” per Eq.25 (dotted line series).  Three 
episodes of Statutory Losses occur [Π𝑄𝑛 ≤ 0, (𝑛 = 7,8,10)] but given Depreciation is a 
non-cash item, FFO remains positive in all years.   
 
 Generator Earnings (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
 
 
 
50 From 2016-2018 a series of Major Inspections are undertaken, each involving $15m capital expenditure. The last of 
these is primarily responsible for the 2017/18 result but note delaying the capital works by a year would only amplify 
the 2018/19 result.  
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 Pure-Play Retailer 
The Retailer has a more stable revenue stream than the Generator, but experiences 
volatility in its wholesale markets purchases as the stacked-bar chart in Fig.12 
reveals.  The business similarly experiences four episodes of zero or negative 
earnings [Π𝑄𝑛 ≤ 0, (𝑛 = 3,4,5,9)].  FFO (dotted line series) remains positive, albeit just, 
over the 15 year trading history.     
 
 Retailer Earnings (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
 
 M&A Event: Vertical Integration 
When the two businesses are merged, a series of important outcomes arise.  The 
first is 95.3% of the Generator’s on-market transactions are internalised (i.e. forming 
part of the Retailer’s hedge book) and for reasons which become evident (Figs.16-
18) the cost of debt finance reduces in line with the credit-standing of the merged 
entity.  All other cost and revenue parameters are otherwise held constant.   
 
Recall that as stand-alone businesses, multiple loss or break-even results were 
observed [Π𝐺,𝑅𝑛 ≤ 0, (𝑛 = 3,4,5,7,8,9,10)]. The merged entity, 𝑉𝐼, experiences no such 
near misses either with Profits Π𝑉𝐼𝑛  or FFO𝑉𝐼𝑛 , 2008/09 being the most challenging. 
 
 Vertical Earnings (2004/05-2018/19) 
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These results are worth exploring further by contrasting the variation of Profits and 
FFO by business combination (Fig.14-15).  Note the relative volatility of earnings, Π𝛽𝑛, 
evident from the box-plots and reported Coefficient of Variation Statistics.  The most 
volatile business combination is the Project Financed Generator, followed by the 
Pure-Play Retailer.  Notice also that the Vertically Integrated firm is the only business 
combination that avoids losses, significantly outperforms a simple Sum-of-the-Parts 
and has the tightest distribution of Earnings by a considerable margin (Coeff. of Var. 
at 0.42).  To be perfectly clear, the Sum-of-the-Parts and Vertical Integration are 
directly comparable – they comprise the exact same businesses but the latter 
combination has been optimised as noted above. 
 
While the motive for integration is primarily driven by bounded rationality, incomplete 
markets and asymmetric information, recall from the financial economics literature 
(Section 2.2) that M&A activity is also optimised when firms have similar earnings 
volatility, asset complementarity and low earnings correlations (evident in Fig.14) – 
and thus integration in this instance is entirely predictable from many dimensions.  An 
equivalent set of results applies to FFO𝛽𝑛, which as the next section reveals, is a 
critical cash flow metric.   
 NPAT (𝚷𝜷
𝒏) Distribution by Business Combination 
 
 
 FFO Distribution by Business Combination 
 
 
 Analysis of credit quality 
Of critical importance to the financial stability of firms and the power system more 
generally is the presence of investment grade credit for reasons set out in Section 
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2.3 vis-à-vis timely investment (Simshauser, 2010).  It is well beyond the scope of 
this article to undertake a comprehensive review of the credit quality of the business 
combinations51, but three ratios provide helpful screening metrics: 
 
Table 7:   Credit Ratings Metrics 
 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2014; Moody’s, 2017a, 2017b) 
 
Comparative results for the Generator, Retailer and Vertically Integrated firm for each 
metric In Table 7 are illustrated in Figs.16-18, with grey-shaded areas representing 
‘BBB’ credit quality (BBB- being the threshold for investment grade).  In Fig.16-17, 
credit quality is monotonic, whereas in Fig.18 credit quality is nonmonotonic (i.e. a 
lower result demonstrates enhanced credit standing).   
 
Neither stand-alone Generation nor Retailing exhibit anything like investment-grade 
credit metrics.  The Generator experiences three incursions into investment-grade 
territory, whereas Retail displays ‘junk’ quality from Year 2 onwards.  Conversely, the 
Vertically Integrated firm consistently produces investment metrics with one transient 
excursion across all metrics in 2008/09 (and to a lesser extent, 2007/08) highlighted 
by the red circles in Fig.16-18.  During 2007/08 wholesale prices surged due to a 
‘millennial drought’.  Regulatory lag vis-à-vis regulated Retail Price Caps meant all 
Retailers experienced difficult trading conditions in 2007/08.  These same conditions 
were ideal for Generators, and consequently a merger displays profoundly positive 
effects across the three metrics.  The 2008/09 and 2012/13 results for Retailers (see 
blue circles) reflected random and capricious regulated Price Cap determinations 
(2008/09 being the subject of a successful court challenge, and in 2012/13 a political 
intervention).  In all cases, integration improved overall profitability, credit quality and 
helped mitigate the worst effects of adverse regulatory outcomes. 
 
 FFO/Interest  (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
  
 
51 The array of quantitative and qualitative measures is indeed vast (See (Standard & Poor’s, 2014; Moody’s, 2017a, 
2017b) for further details).  The most logical manner to analyse the current set of credit results is to assume these 
business combinations are regional subsidiaries of a larger multi-regional energy utility, and whether the current 
businesses under consideration are likely to add or subtract to overall credit quality.   
Credit Metric Investment Grade (BBB)
Sub-Investment 
Grade
FFO / Interest ≥ 4.0x - 8.0x < 4.0x
FFO / Debt ≥ 0.19 - 0.35 < 0.20x
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 FFO/Debt (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
 
 Debt/EBITDA (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
 
The fact that the Vertical firm experiences a transient excursion outside investment 
grade territory (i.e. 2008/09) does not mean an automatic downgrade, although 
‘negative watch’ would surely arise.  Ratings Agencies ‘look through’ transient 
deterioration in metrics and in my view, the extraordinary trading conditions in 
2008/09 would have been accounted for accordingly.  
 
 Economies of Vertical Integration 
Analysing the extent to which Generation and Retail have sub-additive costs or 
economies of vertical integration (𝐸𝑉𝐼𝑛) is based on Eq.30 (Baumol, Panzer and 
Willig, 1982).  A positive value implies economies of integration and a negative value 
implies diseconomies.  
 
∑ 𝐸𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐼
𝑛|𝑌|
𝑛=1 = (∑
𝐶(𝐺,0)
𝑛 +𝐶(0,𝑅)
𝑛 −𝐶(𝑉𝐼)
𝑛
𝐶(𝑉𝐼)
𝑛  
|𝑌|
𝑛=1 )      (30) 
 
Eq.30 is applied to 3 different Cost parameters (Cash Operating Costs, Total Costs, 
and Total Costs less excess Generation sales) and thee earnings metrics (NPAT, 
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FFO and Economic Returns52).  Results are presented in Table 8.  All measures point 
to material multi-stage economies of integration. Costs of the Vertical Firm are 15-
17% lower than the Sum-Of-The-Parts.  Statutory earnings (i.e. NPAT) are up 35% 
and Credit Quality (FFO) is enhanced by 26%.  Economic Returns from the 
combined entity are greater than either of the stand-alone entities and 25% higher 
than the Sum-Of-The-Parts.  And finally, as Figure 14 illustrated the dispersion of 
Statutory Profits were reduced by 83% - something which capital markets (and equity 
capital markets in particular) value.53  
 
Table 8:   Economies of Vertical Integration (2004/05-2018/19) 
 
 
The Generator’s 540MW capacity covered (on average) 64% of the Retailer’s peak 
demand and 23% of energy demand over the 15-year trading window.  It was profit 
maximising to sell any surplus generation capacity into the spot and forward markets 
and would be unprofitable to withhold this capacity.   
 
The combined business was not optimised per se.  The analysis merely merged two 
random businesses54 from the QLD region of the NEM.  As is often the way with 
M&As, opportunity reflects what is available, not necessarily what is optimal.  
Consequently, multi-stage economies of integration could well be significantly higher 
if a semi-base plant (i.e. CCGT) was also added – scope for further research exists in 
this regard. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Should Australian policymakers be concerned with vertically integrated firms in the 
NEM?  To answer this, it is worth reflecting on the starting proposition enshrined 
within Transaction Cost Economics:  vertical integration is an organisational form of 
last resort (Williamson, 2008).  Ultimately, firms prefer market-based transactions 
until costs exceed the bureaucratic costs of bringing functions in-house.  As Stuckey 
and White (1993) explain, vertical M&As are expensive, risky and particularly hard to 
unwind.  Adjacent segments usually require vastly different skill sets.   
 
It is noteworthy that there are no large unintegrated merchant utilities in Australia’s 
NEM, something that Kwoka (2002) observed in the US almost two decades ago.  
The practical evidence is that ‘cost forces’ and ‘sequential adaptation’ vis-à-vis 
transaction costs are important in determining merchant utility industrial organisation.  
Quantitative results from combining a Retailer (c.330,000 mass market customers) 
 
52 Economic Returns =∑ (
Π̂𝛽
𝑛
𝐸𝑄𝛽
𝑛) |Π̂𝛽
𝑛 =
|𝑌|
𝑛=1 Π𝛽
𝑛 + (0.8 ∙ 𝑑𝛽
𝑖 ). Here, depreciation is adjusted downwards by 80% to reflect 
economic rather than taxation lives.  
53 From a purely practical perspective, the issue here is that when the Board and Executive of a listed firm commit to 
profit guidance, a tighter distribution of probable earnings means better prospects of delivering against that 
commitment. 
54 The Retail business is notionally based on AGL Energy’s Queensland subsidiary, and the Generator is notionally 
based on Alinta’s OCGT subsidiary. 
Period 2004/05-2018/19 Generation Retail Sum-of-the-Parts Vertical Integration EVI
Cummulative Costs
  Cash Operating Costs* 839              11,469          12,309                  10,734                   15%
  Total Costs* 1,232           11,881          13,113                  11,331                   16%
  Total Costs* - Gen Sales 1,232           11,881          13,113                  11,253                   17%
-                        
Cumulative Earnings
  Net Profit After Tax 207              296               503                       763                        34%
  Funds From Operations 394              371               764                       1,025                     25%
  Economic Returns 7.3% 7.2% 7.2% 9.6% 25%
Dispersion of Earnings (Fig.14)
  Coefficient of Variation 1.16             1.53              0.77                      0.42                       83%
* Cash Operating Costs excludes Depreciation & Amortisation and Finance Costs.  Total Costs includes Deprec. & Amort. and Finance Costs.
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and Generator (540MW OCGT) demonstrate multi-stage economies of 15-17% vis-à-
vis cost efficiencies, a 35% improvement in reportable (statutory) profits, a 26% 
improvement in credit quality and an 83% improvement in the dispersion of earnings.  
Little wonder vertical business combinations have formed the dominant model in the 
NEM.   
 
Vertical integration has provided the means by which to stabilise profits, navigate ‘the 
missing money’, mitigate the worst effects of capricious regulatory interventions, 
maintain investment-grade credit metrics and in turn – the continuity of investment in 
timely new plant capacity given the market for Project Financed merchant plant is 
largely closed.   
 
Adverse views of vertical practices by policymakers are, in my view, conflating 
problems of market power derived from horizontal scale with an otherwise benign 
form of industrial organisation initiated to navigate transaction costs, viz. asset 
specificity, bounded rationality, incomplete markets, capricious regulatory decisions, 
asymmetric information and uncertainty – all of which present hazards for ex-ante 
investment commitment, and ex-post performance. 
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GENERATOR PROFIT & LOSS
Year Index 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ANNUAL LOAD
Generation MWh 925,524  931,572  1,339,164   1,551,294   926,820  951,048  990,090  951,318  1,058,022   712,368  1,619,244   1,285,524   730,062   857,664   401,058   
REVENUES
Spot Market Revenue 54.7 64.5 150.9 152.8 62.4 74.8 64.0 40.2 123.4 70.9 153.9 126.9 173.8 87.7 55.8
Contract for Differences / Hedges $m 16.4 11.7 -0.6 0.9 38.5 18.2 15.1 24.5 3.6 7.8 -37.7 4.1 -24.2 33.7 26.6
Total Sales Revenue $m 71.1 76.2 150.3 153.8 100.9 93.0 79.1 64.7 127.0 78.8 116.3 131.0 149.6 121.4 82.4
EXPENSES
Fuel $m 30.4         31.9         47.0            57.3            34.9         37.0         40.0         38.7         43.9            30.5         27.4            63.1            70.8         67.0         42.6         
O&M $m 8.0           8.3           9.8               11.0            9.2           9.6           10.0         10.0         10.6            9.6           13.4            12.2            10.2         10.9         9.1           
Carbon Costs $m -           -           -              -              -           -           -           -           14.6            10.0         -              -              -           -           -           
Total Expenses $m 38.4         40.2         56.9            68.3            44.1         46.5         50.0         48.8         69.2            50.2         40.8            75.4            81.0         77.9         51.8         
EBITDA $m 32.7 36.0 93.4 85.5 56.8 46.5 29.1 15.9 57.8 28.6 75.5 55.6 68.7 43.6 30.6
Depreciation and amortisation $m 15.3         15.3         15.3            15.3            15.3         15.3         15.3         15.3         15.3            15.3         15.3            15.3            15.8         16.3         16.8         
EBIT $m 17.4         20.7         78.1            70.2            41.5         31.2         13.8         0.6           42.5            13.2         60.2            40.3            52.8         27.2         13.8         
Financing costs $m 10.6         10.6         10.5            12.9            12.8         12.8         12.7         13.0         9.9               9.8           9.8               9.8               9.7           8.0           6.9           
Taxation 5.2           6.2           23.4            21.1            12.4         9.4           4.1           0.2           12.7            4.0           18.1            12.1            15.9         8.2           4.1           
NPAT $m 1.6           3.9           44.1            36.2            16.2         9.0           3.1-           12.5-         19.9            0.6-           32.3            18.5            27.3         11.1         2.7           
FFO $m 15.9         19.3         59.5            51.6            31.5         24.4         12.2         2.8           35.2            14.8         47.6            18.8            28.1         12.4         19.6         
FFO/I FFO/I 2.5           2.8           6.7               5.0               3.5           2.9           2.0           1.2           4.6               2.5           5.9               2.9               3.9           2.6           3.8           
Distributions
Dvidend 90% 1.4 3.5 39.7 32.6 14.6 8.1 0.0 0.0 17.9 0.0 29.1 16.6 24.5 10.0 2.5
Retained earnings 0.2 0.4 4.4 3.6 1.6 0.9 -3.1 -12.5 2.0 -0.6 3.2 1.8 2.7 1.1 0.3
Economic Returns 3.9% 4.6% 15.9% 13.5% 7.8% 5.8% 2.5% -0.1% 9.2% 3.3% 12.7% 8.7% 11.2% 6.7% 4.5%
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GENERATOR BALANCE SHEET
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ASSETS
Current asset -           -           
Cash and cash equivalents $m 19.6 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 38.1 38.1 34.8 34.8
Trade receivables $m 7.9 8.2 8.8 17.3 17.7 11.6 10.7 9.1 7.4 14.6 9.1 13.4 15.1 17.2 14.0 9.5
Total current asset $m 27.5 49.5 50.1 58.6 59.0 52.9 52.0 50.4 48.7 55.9 50.4 54.7 53.2 55.3 48.8 44.3
Non-current asset
Generation Plant $m 459.0 444.7 429.4 414.0 398.7 383.4 368.0 352.7 337.4 322.0 306.7 291.4 291.0 290.2 288.9 272.0
Total non-current asset $m 459.0 444.7 429.4 414.0 398.7 383.4 368.0 352.7 337.4 322.0 306.7 291.4 291.0 290.2 288.9 272.0
Total asset $m 486.5 494.2 479.4 472.6 457.7 436.3 420.0 403.1 386.1 377.9 357.1 346.0 344.2 345.5 337.6 316.3
LIABILITIES
Current liability
Trade payables $m 3.0                3.2              3.3           4.7           5.6           3.6           3.8           4.1           4.0           5.7           4.1           3.4           6.2           6.7           6.4           4.3           
Interest payable $m -                2.6              2.6           2.6           3.2           3.2           3.2           3.1           3.2           2.4           2.4           2.4           2.4           2.4           2.0           1.7           
Provision - Taxes $m -                5.2              6.2           23.4         21.1         12.4         9.4           4.1           0.2           12.7         4.0           18.1         12.1         15.9         8.2           4.1           
Total current liabilities $m 3.0                11.0            12.1         30.7         29.8         19.2         16.3         11.4         7.4           20.9         10.5         23.8         20.7         24.9         16.5         10.1         
Non-current liabilities
Term Loan A $m 38.6              38.1            37.5         37.0         36.3         35.7         34.9         34.1         33.7         33.3         32.9         32.4         31.8         31.2         30.6         30.0         
Term Loan B $m 90.0              90.0            90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         90.0         
Total non-current liabilities $m 128.5            128.0          127.5       126.9       126.3       125.6       124.9       124.1       123.7       123.3       122.8       122.3       121.8       121.2       120.5       120.0       
Total liabilities $m 131.5            139.0          139.6       157.6       156.1       144.9       141.2       135.5       131.1       144.1       133.3       146.1       142.5       146.1       137.1       130.1       
NET ASSET $m 355.0 355.2 339.8 315.0 301.6 291.4 278.8 267.6 255.0 233.8 223.7 199.9 201.7 199.4 200.6 186.2
EQUITY
Issued capital $m 355.0            355.0          355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       355.0       
Retained earnings / losses $m -                0.2              0.6           5.0           8.6           10.2         11.1         8.0           4.5-           2.5-           3.1-           0.1           2.0           4.7           5.8           6.1           
Total equity attributable to owners $m 355.0            355.2          355.6       360.0       363.6       365.2       366.1       363.0       350.5       352.5       351.9       355.1       357.0       359.7       360.8       361.1       
Gearing 26% 26% 27% 27% 28% 29% 30% 31% 32% 33% 34% 35% 35% 35% 36% 38%
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GENERATOR CASH FLOW STATEMENT
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Receipts from customers 70.9 75.6 141.8 153.4 107.0 93.9 80.7 66.4 119.8 84.3 112.0 129.3 147.5 124.7 86.9
Payments to suppliers 38.3 40.0 55.5 67.3 46.1 46.3 49.7 48.9 67.5 51.8 41.5 72.5 80.5 78.1 53.9
Interest paid 8.0 10.6 10.5 12.3 12.9 12.8 12.7 12.9 10.6 9.9 9.8 9.8 9.7 8.4 7.2
Payment to tax office 0.0 5.2 6.2 23.4 21.1 12.4 9.4 4.1 0.2 12.7 4.0 18.1 12.1 15.9 8.2
Net cashflows provided by operating activities 24.6 19.8 69.5 50.3 27.0 22.4 8.9 0.5 41.5 10.0 56.6 29.0 45.2 22.3 17.6
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Cash flow from securities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital expenditure (capex on OCGT) 1.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Net cashflows provided by investing activities -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -15.0 -15.0 -15.0 0.0
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Proceeds from share market 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Proceeds from borrowings (Term Loan A) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Proceeds from borrowings (Term Loan B) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Loan Redemptions 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6
Capital Distrbutions 0.0 15.8 29.2 17.1 11.8 13.5 8.1 0.1 23.2 9.5 27.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 14.6
Dividends 1.4 3.5 39.7 32.6 14.6 8.1 0.0 0.0 17.9 0.0 29.1 16.6 24.5 10.0 2.5
Net cashflows provided by financing activities -1.9 -19.8 -69.5 -50.3 -27.0 -22.4 -8.9 -0.5 -41.5 -10.0 -56.6 -17.2 -30.2 -10.6 -17.6 
Net Cash Flows 21.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.2 0.0 -3.3 0.0
Closing Cash 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 38.1 38.1 34.8 34.8
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RETAILER PROFIT & LOSS STATEMENT
Year Index 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Resi customer numbers 288,242 293,075 297,328 303,855 308,284 315,290 319,546 325,728 331,513 334,295 339,212 344,311 349,129 355,071 366,829
Swicthing 2% spread -5,765 -5,862 -5,947 55,558 62,586 67,236 74,426 62,463 53,162 49,670 49,168 50,012 68,280 101,624 80,230
SME customer numbers 41,177 41,868 42,475 43,408 44,041 45,041 45,649 46,533 47,359 47,756 48,459 49,187 49,876 50,724 52,404
Swicthing 3% spread -824 -837 -850 7,937 8,941 9,605 10,632 8,923 7,595 7,096 7,024 7,145 9,754 14,518 11,461
ANNUAL LOAD
Resi load volume 70% MWh 2,123,077   2,276,417   2,235,587   2,190,871   2,300,891   2,466,815   2,367,754   2,116,235   2,061,719   2,099,461   2,053,365   2,044,798   2,076,127   2,023,708   2,053,646   
SME load volume 30% MWh 909,890      975,607      958,109      938,945      986,096      1,057,206   1,014,752   906,958      883,594      899,769      880,014      876,342      889,769      867,303      880,134      
C&I load volume MWh 1,452,157   1,474,175   1,473,458   1,473,639   1,548,627   1,706,921   1,588,576   1,440,230   1,340,535   1,366,580   1,275,665   1,213,061   1,212,722   1,195,778   1,212,990   
Total annual load MWh 4,485,123   4,726,199   4,667,153   4,603,455   4,835,614   5,230,943   4,971,082   4,463,423   4,285,847   4,365,810   4,209,043   4,134,201   4,178,619   4,086,789   4,146,770   
SALES REVENUES
Resi $m 282.4 309.1 298.0 321.0 360.3 423.9 461.2 448.7 493.4 606.8 610.5 575.3 605.6 604.5 594.2
SME $m 126.1 138.4 139.9 150.5 162.6 199.0 216.2 209.8 190.2 225.8 226.9 214.6 245.5 247.8 236.3
C&I $m 107.7 113.3 118.4 145.1 158.5 168.4 155.8 152.2 174.8 203.9 182.9 170.2 181.0 194.6 191.7
Total sales $m 516.3 560.8 556.3 616.7 681.4 791.4 833.2 810.7 858.4 1,036.5 1,020.3 960.2 1,032.1 1,046.9 1,022.2
EXPENSES
Network (N Resi) $m 118.9 136.6 145.6 155.1 175.0 201.2 221.7 226.0 252.6 304.6 332.7 310.1 305.3 248.6 237.3
Network (N SME) $m 45.7 52.8 56.1 59.5 67.4 77.8 85.9 85.6 99.7 122.2 132.4 120.9 124.2 103.0 92.5
Network (N C&I) $m 36.5 39.9 43.1 46.7 52.9 62.8 67.2 68.0 75.6 92.8 96.0 83.7 84.6 71.0 63.8
Pool purchases $m 139.5          151.9          270.6          281.5          180.8          204.0          175.2          136.1          312.0          270.6          287.9          281.0          474.9          312.6          356.8          
Hedge costs $m 42.8            42.6            71.2-            2.1-               117.1          71.8            58.0            63.7            60.1-            16.4            49.6-            31.6-            200.3-          42.7            3.8-               
Total Network & Wholesale Costs $m 383.4          423.8          444.4          540.7          593.2          617.6          608.0          579.4          679.8          806.7          799.5          764.1          788.7          777.8          746.7          
Green / Carbon Costs $m 9.6 11.7 14.0 15.1 17.9 26.1 21.6 37.4 48.6 44.3 34.2 36.1 48.3 61.2 81.1
Ancillary services $m 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.8
NEM fees $m 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2
Losses $m 18.1 18.3 18.5 22.6 26.0 26.1 23.4 23.8 22.7 25.8 21.5 19.7 24.1 32.3 31.5
TOTAL G+N Costs $m 413.9 456.6 479.7 581.3 640.5 673.4 656.6 644.3 754.8 879.6 859.3 823.3 864.6 874.9 863.3
Retail Operating Costs $m 26.9 32.7 34.0 35.6 37.1 38.8 40.4 42.2 44.0 45.5 47.3 49.2 51.1 53.1 56.2
Customer Acquisition Costs $m 11.7 12.2 12.6 13.2 13.8 14.4 15.0 15.7 16.3 16.9 17.6 17.9 18.6 19.4 20.5
Other Retail Costs m$ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Total G+N+R m$ 452.9 502.0 526.9 630.7 691.9 727.3 712.6 702.7 815.6 942.6 924.8 890.9 934.9 948.0 940.6
Bad debts 1% m$ 5.2 5.6 5.6 6.2 6.8 7.9 8.3 8.1 8.6 10.4 10.2 9.6 10.3 10.5 10.2
Total Expenses m$ 458.1 507.6 532.4 636.9 698.8 735.2 720.9 710.8 824.2 952.9 935.0 900.5 945.2 958.4 950.8
EBITDA m$ 58.2 53.2 23.9 -20.2 -17.4 56.1 112.3 99.9 34.2 83.6 85.3 59.6 86.9 88.5 71.4
Depreciation and amortisation m$ 8.7 9.1 9.6 9.8 10.2 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7
EBIT 49.5 44.1 14.3 -29.9 -27.6 50.1 106.1 93.6 27.9 77.2 78.8 53.1 80.4 81.8 64.7
Financing costs m$ 11.8 11.8 11.7 13.5 16.7 20.8 25.8 27.2 24.6 24.4 24.1 23.8 23.5 21.9 17.3
Taxation 11.3 9.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 9.0 24.1 19.9 1.0 15.8 16.4 8.8 17.0 18.0 14.2
NPAT m$ 26.3 22.6 1.8 -43.4 -44.2 20.3 56.2 46.5 2.3 36.9 38.3 20.5 39.8 41.9 33.2
FFO m$ 33.1 29.7 9.3 -35.9 -36.3 24.0 59.9 50.3 6.1 40.7 42.1 24.3 43.6 45.8 37.0
FFO/I FFO/I 3.8 3.5 1.8 -1.7 -1.2 2.2 3.3 2.8 1.2 2.7 2.7 2.0 2.9 3.1 3.1
Distribution 
Dvidend 90% 23.7 20.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.5 18.4 35.8 37.8 29.8
Retained earnings 2.63 2.26 1.83 -43.44 -44.24 20.26 56.22 46.49 2.28 36.95 3.83 2.05 3.98 4.19 3.32
Economic Returns 9.9% 8.9% 2.8% -10.4% -12.1% 9.9% 22.3% 15.6% 1.9% 11.1% 10.4% 6.1% 10.7% 11.1% 8.9%
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RETAILER BALANCE SHEET
Year Index Open 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ASSETS
Current asset
Cash and cash equivalents 0 $m 137.4 132.6 130.8 94.7 109.0 112.6 186.0 232.4 232.4 232.1 284.0 240.6 236.5 205.2 233.2 233.6
Trade receivables 0 $m 106.3 109.6 119.7 119.7 117.7 127.8 142.0 167.4 179.8 174.4 182.9 222.1 221.5 208.2 224.7 226.2
Market Prudential Deposits $m 0.0 25.9 27.3 64.1 63.2 66.4 71.8 68.2 61.3 58.8 59.9 65.8 64.6 124.7 121.9 123.7
Total current asset $m 243.7 268.1 277.8 278.5 289.9 306.8 399.8 468.1 473.5 465.4 526.9 528.5 522.6 538.1 579.8 583.4
Non-current asset
Retail assets $m 93.0 86.3 79.2 71.8 64.2 56.3 52.6 48.9 45.1 41.3 37.5 33.7 29.9 26.0 22.1 18.2
Goodwill $m 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7
Total non-current asset $m 265.7 259.0 251.9 244.5 236.9 229.0 225.3 221.6 217.8 214.0 210.2 206.4 202.6 198.7 194.8 191.0
Total asset $m 509.5 527.0 529.7 522.9 526.9 535.8 625.1 689.7 691.3 679.4 737.2 734.9 725.2 736.8 774.7 774.4
LIABILITIES
Current liability
Trade payables 0 $m 31.4           33.1           36.1           37.4           47.9           52.0           51.7           48.2           44.8           52.7           61.4           57.8           56.9           59.7           65.5           64.3           
Interests payables 0 $m -             2.9             2.9             2.9             3.3             4.1             5.1             6.4             6.7             6.1             6.0             5.9             5.9             5.8             5.4             4.3             
Provision - Taxes 0 $m -             11.3           9.7             0.8             -             -             9.0             24.1           19.9           1.0             15.8           16.4           8.8             17.0           18.0           14.2           
Total current liabilities $m 31.4           47.3           48.7           41.1           51.2           56.1           65.9           78.7           71.4           59.7           83.3           80.1           71.5           82.6           88.9           82.7           
Non-current liabilities
Term Loan A $m 71.3           70.4           69.4           68.4           105.7         154.0         213.2         208.8         206.4         203.9         201.2         198.2         195.0         191.6         219.0         221.5         
Term Loan B $m 71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           71.3           
Deferred tax liabilities 0 $m
Total non-current liabilities $m 142.6         141.7         140.8         139.7         177.0         225.3         284.5         280.1         277.7         275.2         272.5         269.5         266.4         262.9         290.3         292.9         
Total liabilities $m 174.1         189.0         189.4         180.8         228.2         281.4         350.4         358.8         349.2         334.9         355.7         349.7         337.9         345.5         379.2         375.6         
NET ASSET $m 335.4 338.0 340.3 342.1 298.7 254.4 274.7 330.9 342.2 344.5 381.4 385.2 387.3 391.3 395.5 398.8
EQUITY
Issued capital $m 335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         335.4         
Retained earnings / losses $m -             2.6             4.9             6.7             36.7-           80.9-           60.7-           4.5-             42.0           44.3           81.3           85.1           87.1           91.1           95.3           98.6           
Total equity attributable to owners $m 335.4         338.0         340.3         342.1         298.7         254.4         274.7         330.9         377.4         379.7         416.6         420.5         422.5         426.5         430.7         434.0         
Gearing 28% 27% 27% 27% 34% 42% 46% 41% 40% 41% 37% 37% 37% 36% 37% 38%
 Page 42 
 
  
RETAILER CASH FLOW STATEMENT
Year Index 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Receipts from customers 487.1 549.3 519.5 619.5 668.1 771.8 811.3 805.3 866.3 1026.9 975.3 961.9 985.4 1033.1 1019.0
Payments to suppliers 456.5 504.6 531.1 626.4 694.7 735.4 724.5 714.3 816.3 944.2 938.6 901.4 942.3 952.7 952.0
Interest paid 8.9 11.8 11.7 13.1 15.9 19.8 24.6 26.9 25.2 24.4 24.2 23.9 23.6 22.3 18.4
Payment to tax office 0.0 11.3 9.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 9.0 24.1 19.9 1.0 15.8 16.4 8.8 17.0 18.0
Net cashflows provided by operating activities 21.7 21.7 -33.0 -20.8 -42.5 16.6 53.3 40.0 4.8 57.2 -3.4 20.1 10.7 41.1 30.6
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Cash flow from securities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Payments for assets acquired 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital expenditure (capex on OCGT) 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8
Net cashflows provided by investing activities -2.0 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -2.5 -2.5 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8 
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Proceeds from share market 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Proceeds from borrowings (Term Loan A) 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.4 50.2 62.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.1 6.5
Proceeds from borrowings (Term Loan B) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Loan Redemptions 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.9 2.9 4.4 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9
Return of Capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dividend paid 23.7 20.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.5 18.4 35.8 37.8 29.8
Net cashflows provided by financing activities -24.6 -21.3 -1.0 37.3 48.3 59.2 -4.4 -37.5 -2.5 -2.7 -37.4 -21.6 -39.2 -10.4 -27.3 
Net Cash Flows -4.9 -1.7 -36.1 14.3 3.5 73.4 46.4 0.0 -0.3 51.9 -43.4 -4.1 -31.3 27.9 0.4
Closing Cash 132.6 130.8 94.7 109.0 112.6 186.0 232.4 232.4 232.1 284.0 240.6 236.5 205.2 233.2 233.6
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VERTICAL INTEGRATION PROFIT & LOSS
Year Index 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ANNUAL LOAD
Resi load volume MWh 2,123        2,276        2,236        2,191        2,301        2,467        2,368        2,116        2,062        2,099        2,053        2,045        2,076        2,024        2,054        
SME load volume MWh 910           976           958           939           986           1,057        1,015        907           884           900           880           876           890           867           880           
C&I load volume MWh 1,452        1,474        1,473        1,474        1,549        1,707        1,589        1,440        1,341        1,367        1,276        1,213        1,213        1,196        1,213        
Generation MWh -926 -932 -1,339 -1,551 -927 -951 -990 -951 -1,058 -712 -1,619 -1,286 -730 -858 -401 
Total annual load MWh 3,560        3,795        3,328        3,052        3,909        4,280        3,981        3,512        3,228        3,653        2,590        2,849        3,449        3,229        3,746        
SALES REVENUE
Resi $m 282.4 309.1 298.0 321.0 360.3 423.9 461.2 448.7 493.4 606.8 610.5 575.3 605.6 604.5 594.2
SME $m 126.1 138.4 139.9 150.5 162.6 199.0 216.2 209.8 190.2 225.8 226.9 214.6 245.5 247.8 236.3
C&I $m 107.7 113.3 118.4 145.1 158.5 168.4 155.8 152.2 174.8 203.9 182.9 170.2 181.0 194.6 191.7
Excess Generation Spot Sales $m 0.6 0.2 2.3 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 3.3 1.2 4.3 6.5 4.2 6.8 1.5
Excess Generation Cap Sales $m 6.4 3.4 -3.5 2.2 2.2 1.7 3.3 6.3 1.0 2.4 0.0 3.3 4.4 7.4 2.5
Total sales $m 523.3 564.3 555.1 620.7 684.0 793.2 836.8 817.8 862.8 1,040.1 1,024.5 969.9 1,040.7 1,061.2 1,026.2
EXPENSES
Fuel $m 30.4          31.9          47.0          57.3          34.9          37.0          40.0          38.7          43.9          30.5          27.4          63.1          70.8          67.0          42.6          
O&M $m 8.0            8.3            9.8            11.0          9.2            9.6            10.0          10.0          10.6          9.6            13.4          12.2          10.2          10.9          9.1            
Network (N Resi) $m 118.9 136.6 145.6 155.1 175.0 201.2 221.7 226.0 252.6 304.6 332.7 310.1 305.3 248.6 237.3
Network (N SME) $m 45.7 52.8 56.1 59.5 67.4 77.8 85.9 85.6 99.7 122.2 132.4 120.9 124.2 103.0 92.5
Network (N C&I) $m 36.5 39.9 43.1 46.7 52.9 62.8 67.2 68.0 75.6 92.8 96.0 83.7 84.6 71.0 63.8
Net Pool Purchases $m 85.3 87.5 122.0 130.4 118.7 129.3 111.4 96.7 191.9 200.9 138.2 160.6 305.3 231.7 302.4
Hedge Costs $m 18.9 27.7 -64.4 -8.2 62.8 46.4 35.2 32.4 -52.7 2.3 -8.1 -32.5 -152.4 1.9 -34.7 
Total Network & Wholesale Costs $m 343.9        384.7        359.4        451.9        521.0        564.1        571.4        557.5        621.7        763.0        732.1        718.2        748.0        734.1        713.2        
Green costs $m 9.6 11.7 14.0 15.1 17.9 26.1 21.6 37.4 48.6 44.3 34.2 36.1 48.3 61.2 81.1
Carbon Costs $23 $m 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.6 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ancillary services $m 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.8
NEM fees $m 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2
Losses $m 18.1 18.3 18.5 22.6 26.0 26.1 23.4 23.8 22.7 25.8 21.5 19.7 24.1 32.3 31.5
TOTAL G+N Costs $m 374.3 417.5 394.7 492.4 568.3 619.8 620.0 622.4 711.2 846.0 791.8 777.3 823.8 831.1 829.8
Retail Operating Costs $m 26.9 32.7 34.0 35.6 37.1 38.8 40.4 42.2 44.0 45.5 47.3 49.2 51.1 53.1 56.2
Customer Acquisition Costs $m 11.7 12.2 12.6 13.2 13.8 14.4 15.0 15.7 16.3 16.9 17.6 17.9 18.6 19.4 20.5
Other Retail Costs m$ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Total G+N+R m$ 413.4 462.9 441.9 541.8 619.8 673.7 676.0 680.9 772.1 908.9 857.3 845.0 894.1 904.2 907.1
Bad debts 1% m$ 5.2 5.6 5.6 6.2 6.8 7.9 8.3 8.1 8.6 10.4 10.2 9.6 10.3 10.5 10.2
Total Expenses m$ 418.6 468.5 447.5 548.0 626.6 681.7 684.3 689.0 780.7 919.3 867.5 854.6 904.4 914.7 917.3
EBITDA m$ 104.8 95.8 107.6 72.7 57.4 111.5 152.5 128.8 82.0 120.8 157.1 115.3 136.3 146.5 108.8
Depreciation and amortisation m$ 24.0 24.5 24.9 25.1 25.5 21.4 21.5 21.6 21.7 21.7 21.8 21.9 22.4 23.0 23.6
EBIT 80.7 71.4 82.7 47.6 31.8 90.1 131.0 107.2 60.4 99.1 135.3 93.4 113.8 123.5 85.3
Financing costs m$ 17.1 16.9 16.8 20.2 20.1 19.9 19.7 20.5 15.9 15.7 15.6 15.4 15.3 12.6 11.1
Taxation 19.1 16.3 19.8 8.2 3.5 21.1 33.4 26.0 13.4 25.0 35.9 23.4 29.6 33.3 22.3
NPAT m$ 44.55 38.10 46.16 19.14 8.24 49.16 77.89 60.71 31.17 58.37 83.77 54.61 69.00 77.64 51.93
FFO m$ 65.6 60.5 68.9 42.0 31.5 68.2 96.9 79.8 50.3 77.5 102.9 58.8 73.7 82.8 72.6
FFO/I 4.8            4.6            5.1            3.1            2.6            4.4            5.9            4.9            4.2            5.9            7.6            4.8            5.8            7.6            7.5            
Distributions
Dvidends 90% $m 40.1 34.3 41.5 17.2 7.4 44.2 70.1 54.6 28.1 52.5 75.4 49.1 62.1 69.9 46.7
Retained earnings $m 4.5 3.8 4.6 1.9 0.8 4.9 7.8 6.1 3.1 5.8 8.4 5.5 6.9 7.8 5.2
Economic Returns 9.2% 8.3% 9.5% 5.6% 4.1% 9.4% 13.4% 10.8% 6.7% 10.4% 13.8% 9.7% 11.6% 12.7% 9.3%
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VERTICAL INTEGRATION BALANCE SHEET
YEAR Open 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ASSETS
Current asset
Cash and cash equivalents $m 157.0 198.0 198.0 198.0 198.0 198.0 198.0 207.4 208.9 217.8 251.2 240.3 236.4 264.2 262.7 263.1
Trade receivables 0 $m 114.2 117.8 128.4 137.0 135.4 139.5 152.7 176.5 187.3 189.0 192.0 235.4 236.6 225.4 238.7 235.6
Market Prudential Deposits $m 0.0 3.8 4.0 4.8 6.7 7.0 7.6 7.2 6.5 13.2 18.5 17.9 17.6 19.0 26.9 36.0
Total current asset $m 271.3 319.6 330.4 339.7 340.0 344.4 358.2 391.1 402.7 420.0 461.7 493.6 490.5 508.6 528.3 534.7
Non-current asset
Retail assets $m 93.0 86.3 79.2 71.8 64.2 56.3 52.6 48.9 45.1 41.3 37.5 33.7 29.9 26.0 22.1 18.2
Generation Plant $m 459.0 444.7 429.4 414.0 398.7 383.4 368.0 352.7 337.4 322.0 306.7 291.4 291.0 290.2 288.9 272.0
Goodwill $m 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7
Total non-current asset $m 724.7 703.7 681.3 658.5 635.6 612.4 593.3 574.3 555.2 536.1 516.9 497.8 493.6 488.9 483.7 463.0
Total asset $m 996.0 1,023.3 1,011.7 998.2 975.7 956.8 951.5 965.4 957.9 956.0 978.7 991.4 984.1 997.5 1,012.0 997.7
LIABILITIES
Current liability $m
Trade payables 0 $m 34.4          36.3          39.4          42.1          53.5          55.6          55.6          52.3          48.8          58.4          65.5          61.1          63.1          66.4          71.9          68.5          
Interests payables+Loans 0 $m -            4.2            4.2            5.0            5.0            5.0            4.9            4.9            3.9            3.9            3.9            3.8            3.8            3.1            3.1            1.5            
Provision - Taxes 0 $m -            19.1          16.3          19.8          8.2            3.5            21.1          33.4          26.0          13.4          25.0          35.9          23.4          29.6          33.3          22.3          
Total current liabilities $m 34.4          59.6          59.9          66.9          66.7          64.1          81.5          90.6          78.8          75.6          94.4          100.9        90.3          99.1          108.3        92.3          
Non-current liabilities
Term Loan A $m 135.6        133.3        130.9        128.4        125.7        123.0        120.1        117.1        115.4        113.5        111.5        109.5        107.3        105.0        152.6        174.0        
Term Loan B $m 135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        135.6        
Deferred tax liabilities 0 $m
Total non-current liabilities $m 271.2        268.9        266.5        263.9        261.3        258.6        255.7        252.7        251.0        249.1        247.1        245.1        242.9        240.6        288.2        309.5        
Total liabilities $m 305.6        328.4        326.3        330.8        328.0        322.6        337.2        343.3        329.7        324.7        341.6        345.9        333.2        339.7        396.4        401.8        
NET ASSET $m 690.4 694.8 685.4 667.3 647.7 634.2 614.3 622.1 628.2 631.3 637.1 645.5 651.0 657.9 615.6 595.8
EQUITY
Issued capital $m 690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        690.4        
Retained earnings / losses $m -            4.5            8.3            12.9          14.8          15.6          20.5          28.3          34.4          37.5          43.3          51.7          57.2          64.1          71.9          77.0          
Total equity attributable to owners $m 690.4        694.8        698.7        703.3        705.2        706.0        710.9        718.7        724.8        727.9        733.7        742.1        747.6        754.5        762.2        767.4        
Gearing 27% 26% 26% 26% 27% 27% 27% 26% 26% 26% 25% 25% 25% 24% 28% 31%
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VERTICAL INTEGRATION CASH FLOW STATEMENT
Year Index 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Receipts from customers 515.9 553.5 545.9 620.3 679.6 779.4 813.3 807.8 854.3 1,031.8 981.8 969.0 1,050.4 1,039.9 1,020.2
Payments to suppliers 416.8 465.4 444.8 536.6 624.5 681.7 687.6 692.5 771.1 912.1 871.9 852.6 901.1 909.2 920.7
Interest paid 12.9 17.0 15.9 20.3 20.1 19.9 19.8 21.4 15.9 15.8 15.6 15.5 15.9 12.6 12.7
Payment to tax office 0.0 19.1 16.3 19.8 8.2 3.5 21.1 33.4 26.0 13.4 25.0 35.9 23.4 29.6 33.3
Net cashflows provided by operating activities 86.3 52.0 68.9 43.6 26.8 74.3 84.9 60.4 41.3 90.5 69.2 65.1 110.0 88.6 53.6
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Cash flow from securities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital expenditure (capex on OCGT) 3.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 17.7 17.7 17.8 2.8
Net cashflows provided by investing activities -3.0 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -2.5 -2.5 -2.6 -2.6 -17.7 -17.7 -17.8 -2.8
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Proceeds from share market 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Proceeds from borrowings (Term Loan A) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0
Proceeds from borrowings (Term Loan B) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Loan Redemptions 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.6
Capital Returns 0.0 13.3 22.7 21.5 14.3 24.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0
Dividends 40.1 34.3 41.5 17.2 7.4 44.2 70.1 54.6 28.1 52.5 75.4 49.1 62.1 69.9 46.7
Net cashflows provided by financing activities -42.4 -50.0 -66.7 -41.4 -24.5 -71.9 -73.1 -56.4 -29.9 -54.5 -77.5 -51.3 -64.4 -72.3 -50.4
Net Cash Flows 40.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 1.6 8.8 33.4 -10.9 -3.9 27.8 -1.5 0.4
Closing Cash 198.0 198.0 198.0 198.0 198.0 198.0 207.4 208.9 217.8 251.2 240.3 236.4 264.2 262.7 263.1
